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Comment: Tension Following Berisha's U.S. Visit

AU2609102195

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian on 24 September on page 5 carries a 2,000-word commentary by Frrok Cupi under the headline "If Berisha Were Only Plain Sali..."

Commenting on the present legislature's session, Cupi says that it was a "very hot" session, with "many threats and offenses" and that "all this was managed by President Berisha, who was pulling the strings behind the scenes."

The commentator continues: "In essence, the Albanians received Berisha's return from the United States with greater interest than his departure. They thought that the president would return from the great continent of democracy a little quieter, a little changed." He goes on that "after his return, lightning struck out of the blue in the Albanian political scene," mentioning the Cassation Court chairman's [Zef Brozi] dismissal, the passing "two days later, of the antigenocide law by a majority in the legislature," and the attacks of the ruling-party newspapers against members of the opposition, their newspapers and journalists, etc. "The tension has increased everywhere," Cupi says.

He continues: "No one cares about tensions, because, unfortunately, they are normal under Berisha's rule. People are asking what has happened to the United States. Some think that the United States advised Berisha to create such tension. Others say that only the visit to the United States was enough to make the president more courageous. Others think that Berisha would not have done such things if the United States had not advised him to. In fact, this is the main defect of Albanian politics; the tendency to believe that all bad things come from abroad."

Commenting on what might have been said to Berisha in the United States, Cupi says: "It is most unlikely that the intitiative for this tension comes from the United States, and it is even less likely that it comes from the high state offices. This is a result of the failure of Berisha's U.S. visit. He could not get consent for domination of the courts, the Cassation Court in particular; he could not imprison Nano again; he could not solve any item on the national agenda or any economic problem. The inferiority complex he developed while in the United States burst out in the form of tension in Tirana. It is typical of leaders educated by communism that, upon their return from big palaces and big failures, they unload everything on their own people. The same is happening to Berisha. While the communist leaders isolated their countries from the governments they visited, Berisha is casting doubt on the United States itself. Most people think that the United States has taught him to irritate people."

After reporting on the opposition parties cooperating against "the arbitrary measures of the power of the Democratic Party [PD]," Cupi says that "in the essence of the PD's political acts one can see signs of a very grave misfortune." He goes on: "Within only three years, the PD has found itself in the place of the Workers Party in 1990-91 when all the political parties directed their programs toward stopping the evil of one party." Commenting on whether the opposition union will bear fruit or not, the commentator says: "There are several dangers: first the danger from the PD and Berisha's politics, because they are losing all the PD votes to the Socialist Party."

He goes on: "Second, there is a danger that, after some time, another antigenocide law will be announced, this time against the PD, because a lot is being said about the PD perpetrating genocide. U.S. newspapers are writing that Albania remains a police state. Third, how many opposition parties will there be to divide up the power left in the political center by the PD? So far, the opposition has only counted the PD's losses rather than won its victory."

After saying that the PD's policy is to prepare not only for the second elections, but also for the third, Cupi says: "Berisha and his team think that the antigenocide law is in their favor, in fact it is not. No doubt they are stopping some opposition leaders from entering the legislature. In this way, they are urging the voters to give more votes to the opposition parties, because the voters will not stand for such injustice. Surely the ruling party has thought of ways to manipulate votes, not all of them, but enough to get into government again. This is where all the points of the conflict meet that will lead us to third elections. The government that would come to power after an election from which political and economic personalities are excluded would not be able to run the country. In the meantime, the PD will not have control over the state. So the fear of the majority and the injustice of the PD will be gone. Then the consensus of the political parties will be to annul the formal antigenocide law, something that will lead to new elections within a very short period of time, perhaps within days. But it is also possible that the PD will no longer be present in the legislature.

"This will be the result of today's acts. That will be the day when President Berisha will become plain Citizen Sali."

Police Arrest 'Antinational' Leaflet Distributors

AU2509082395 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 24 Sep 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Leaflet Distributors Caught"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Distributors of illegal leaflets have been caught in Tirana. The Interior Ministry in cooperation with the National Intelligence Service, in the course of their work to identify the distributor of antinational and anticonstitutional leaflets in Sarande District on 10 September, have succeeded in detaining the culprits, who are:

Sulejman Rrahman Mekollari, age 59, born in Skrapar and resident of Sarande, a former instructor in the Albanian Workers Party [PPSh] Skrapar District Committee for nine years, and now a pensioner; Dilaver Ibrahim Dauti, age 56, born in Sarande and residing there, a former long-serving Sigurimi collaborator, and today a member of the Socialist Party [PS]; and Lirim Servet Veliu, age 35, born in Sarande and residing there, a former Sigurimi collaborator, and a PS member. Since leaflets of a brazenly antinational character were first noticed in Sarande District, the police and other public order authorities set out to search for the people who had organized their distribution. The three detainees are from the town of Sarande and have longstanding ties to the former communist system and its central organs. Two of them were Sigurimi collaborators, while the third was a former instructor at the Skrapar Party Committee. The evidence was passed to the procurator immediately after their detention.

Cabinet Reportedly To Recall Nine Ambassadors

AU2509191995 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 22 Sep 95 pp 1-2

[24 CHASA staff report: "Nine Ambassadors Secretly Replaced"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Videnov cabinet decided at a secret meeting yesterday to recall nine ambassadors from the so-called president's men. Their names will be submitted to the president, who has to sign the decree.

The first name on the list is that of Slavi Pashovski, our ambassador in New York. The cabinet also wants to recall Lea Koen from Brussels, Svetlozar Raev from Strasbourg, Vladimir Filipov from Lisbon, Elena Kircheva from Bern, Yani Milchakov from Warsaw, Veselin Filev from Budapest, Stefan Naumov from Tirana, and Kiril Marichkov from the Vatican.

The ambassadors earmarked to be replaced next are reportedly Krustyo Krustev in Beirut and Boyan Nichev in Prague.

Yesterday morning Foreign Minister Pirinski saw the president and insisted on Pashovski's recall. In our proposals for new ambassadors we have tried to take account all of Zhelev's wishes, Pirinski said. The president, however, reportedly wanted to discuss the replacements in a month. According to informed sources, Zhelev wants to send abroad as ambassadors his advisers Rumen Danov and Kamen Velichkov and former National Assembly Deputy Asparukh Panov.

Zhelev Accuses Ministry of Shutting Out UN Envoy

AU2509192095 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 22 Sep 95 p 6

[Article by Mira Badzheva and Emil Spakhinski: "Zhelev Accused Foreign Ministry Over Pashovski"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Foreign Ministry is to blame for the scandal involving Slavi Pashovski, our permanent representative at the United Nations, President Zhelev, declared yesterday, because it is acting by commissar methods.

The head of state was adamant that Pashovski is Bulgaria's permanent representative at the United Nations and cannot be excluded from the Bulgarian delegation's work.

The government will evidently not give way in the latest sparring bout between Videnov and Zhelev, after Slavi Pashovski declared that he would not submit his own resignation when the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry recalled him.

Cabinet Evidently Will Openly Declare War

Our ambassador at the United Nations has provoked one of the biggest diplomatic scandals in recent years. The socialist government deleted the name of our permanent UN representative from the list of members of our official delegation to the jubilee session of the UN General Assembly. No similar case has been seen in our recent history. According to informed people, Prime Minister Videnov explicitly stated that he did not wish to set eyes on Pashovski during his visit to New York.

Since Pashovski will not pack his bags voluntarily, the government has two alternatives. It can either adopt an official decision on relieving our ambassador in New York and submit it for Zhelev's signature, or it can stop his salary and take away his code book, which he uses to encode his diplomatic messages. Without his pay and code book, Mr. Pashovski is left helpless and superfluous.

The Socialist cabinet has started an action against Stoyan Ganev's former protege and will hardly refrain from using strong-arm methods. If it becomes clear that Zhelev does not intend to sign the decree relieving Pashovski, the government will resort to the extreme alternative.

"We could have finished with Pashovski long ago, but we did not want to make Bulgaria a laughing stock," a senior diplomat commented. However, the scandal is already a fact, and it has been covered not only in the Bulgarian media, but also on the pages of the American press, so that the government is unlikely to hesitate in carrying the fight against Pashovski through to the bitter end.

This is not the first scandal in which Pashovski has been involved, but it is the biggest one.

The 42-year-old lawyer, whom Stoyan Ganev [former foreign minister] brought into his Foreign Ministry, has been accused of a number of blunders during his three years of service in New York. He has been accused of arranging a college course for his daughter in the United States with UN help and of spending government money on private parties. He was suspected of trying to get his wife a job as a highly paid UN official with a false document supplied by the Bulgarian mission. He was also accused of slipping away on a trip to Africa when he was needed to defend Bulgarian interests at the United Nations.

According to career diplomats, Pashovski is absolutely incompetent and even harmful to the state and for this reason ought to be removed from New York. For his part, Pashovski claims that "the red diplomats" have a grudge against him and, therefore, are trying to discredit him.

The Pashovski affair has another side, however: He may prove to be the cork that, when removed, will release the new ambassadorial appointments from the bottle. Although the Socialists have been in power for nine months now, they have not yet made a single ambassadorial appointment of their own, because they cannot reach an understanding with President Zhelev.

If the president agrees to sign the decree to dismiss Pashovski, the Socialists may finally manage to reach an arrangement with him on the other controversial ambassadors. Otherwise, they may well act in the same way as with Pashovski to remove undesirable president's men from their path.

Envoy Answers Criticism

AU2509204995 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 22 Sep 95 p 6

[Interview with Slavi Pashovski, permanent representative to the United Nations in New York, by Mariana Boyadzhieva; place and date not given: "Government Hinders the President's Ambassadors From Doing Their Jobs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The 42-year-old lawyer Slavi Pashovski started work at the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry in 1992. On 16 August 1992 President Zhelyu Zhelev signed a decree appointing him Bulgaria's permanent representative to the United Nations.*

According to a decision adopted by the Council of Ministers on 7 September 1995, Pashovski's name is not included on the list of members of the Bulgarian delegation to the 50th-anniversary session of the UN General Assembly. In a faxed message dated 16 September, Pashovski demanded an explanation from Foreign Minister Pirinski as to why he is not included in the delegation. Since he had not received any reply by 18 September, the permanent representative obtained his own accreditation to the session. [sentence as published]

Meanwhile, on 18 September Pashovski was recalled for consultations by the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry. He refused to return to Sofia and remained in New York. From there, he made a telephone call accusing the cabinet and the foreign minister of a "miniconstitutional coup d'etat," on the grounds that they had allegedly disturbed the balance among the institutions in the foreign policy field that are established by the Constitution.

At a news conference, Deputy Foreign Minister Irina Bokova advised the ambassador to escape from the situation with dignity by submitting his resignation, since he voices disagreements with the government.

[Boyadzhieva] Mr. Pashovski, you described your exclusion from the Bulgarian delegation as a "constitutional coup d'etat." What precisely did you have in mind?

[Pashovski] The exclusion of Bulgaria's permanent representative from the membership of the delegation to the annual session of the UN General Assembly constitutes a change in the established balance in foreign policy as established in the Constitution. It is true that the government implements the country's foreign policy activities and carries out changes. However, it is evident that these changes cannot be of a kind that remove the powers granted by the Constitution to the other institutions of state.

By removing the permanent representative, because he has no accreditation, the cabinet in effect deprives the president of the possibility of representing the country in international relations through ambassadors appointed by him.

[Boyadzhieva] Are you not afraid that this may have consequences for you?

[Pashovski] It is not a question of the individual Slavi Pashovski, but one of defending the legal order established by the Constitution. If I was afraid and thought about myself, I would not have agreed to take a job in the Foreign Ministry (in 1992—editorial note) and to work so self-sacrificingly as I have done.

[Boyadzhieva] Why did you not obey the foreign minister's order to return to Sofia for consultations on 18 September?

[Pashovski] I will send an explanation on this matter to Foreign Minister Pirinski, and I hope that he or his spokesman will publicize my reply after the problem has been investigated.

[Boyadzhieva] You were appointed to this post three years ago. What is your assessment of your period of service?

[Pashovski] I did not come here to waste my time. (Laughs, and admonishes the reporter for asking an unethical question)

[Boyadzhieva] Your name is associated with a number of scandals relating to financial abuses, tours of Miami Beach casinos, untimely trips to Africa, and expelling the daughter of the chief editor of STANDART NEWS from the Bulgarian mission building in New York. It is said that the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office is conducting an investigation against you. Are these stories true, or are they insinuations from your enemies?

(At first, Pashovski refused to answer, explaining that he will give a more detailed answer when he has a little more free time, that is, following the president's visit to New York at the end of October. Later, he suddenly started talking.)

[Pashovski] I would describe these stories as blatant lies and distortions of the facts. Regarding my trip to Miami Beach, Ambassador Ognyan Pishev had to go there to attend the town twinning ceremony between Miami Beach and Varna. They called me at 7 pm in the evening, and I took the first plane the next morning. The festivities lasted from 10 am to 3 pm.

My mission to Africa last year and my activities there marked a peak in my career. I, Bulgaria's representative, led a UN delegation. We were received in 10 states at the highest level. Can you imagine? I saw the daughter of the chief editor of STANDART NEWS only for 15 minutes. He called to ask me to help find her accommodations, because she had to travel to another state. At that time there were 17 workers and persons on official trips in our mission, and we could not find any room for her. I then even decided to ask my wife and children to sleep together in one room (we have three). The girl turned red with anger, saying: "Please, I do not want to inconvenience you." In the meantime, a ticket was obtained for her, and she left without staying overnight in New York.

My wife had to return home to see to a civil lawsuit concerning property. I found a way to pay for her tickets.

[Boyadzhieva] What stopped you from visiting Bulgaria for two years?

[Pashovski] Ask the Foreign Ministry about its policy regarding leave and consultations! It does not grant us leave like other people.

[Boyadzhieva] As far as I know, this year the Foreign Ministry agreed to pay the traveling expenses of the families of its employees.

[Pashovski] They arranged this for their own people, but as for the ambassadors.... I have sent a fax on this matter.

[Boyadzhieva] What will you do when you are no longer Bulgaria's permanent UN representative?

[Pashovski] You should be glad that I am the permanent representative. (Laughs)

[Boyadzhieva] Are you thinking of resigning as an expression of your disagreement with the policies of the present leaderships of the government and the Foreign Ministry?

[Pashovski] This is their dream, but we will also listen carefully to different views!

[Boyadzhieva] Do any conflicts exist in the Foreign Ministry because of the fact that the ambassadors are the president's men?

[Pashovski] I would prefer such conflicts not to exist, so that what is written in the Constitution becomes a reality and we learn to live in the conditions of a parliamentary democracy.

Further From Pashovski

AU2509192195 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 22 Sep 95 p 6

[Interview with Slavi Pashovski, permanent representative at the United Nations in New York, by Miroslava Badzheva; place and date not given: "The Diplomat Will Not Resign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Badzheva] Mr. Pashovski, did you attend the opening of the jubilee session of the UN General Assembly? You threatened that you would do so, despite the fact that the government excluded you from the official Bulgarian delegation.

[Pashovski] I was only in the corridors outside the hall where the session was held. I did not enter the hall itself, because I am not accredited. I shook hands with colleagues and with ambassadors in their formal attire, but I stayed outside and listened to the applause from inside the hall.

[Badzheva] Deputy Foreign Minister Irina Bokova described your behavior as sniveling.

[Pashovski] These words are taken from her father's dictionary at the time when RABOTNICHESKO DELO [former daily of Bulgarian Communist Party] set a tone in the country from which we are all now trying to escape.

[Badzheva] Why did you refuse to return to Sofia when the Foreign Ministry recalled you for consultations?

[Pashovski] They summoned me on 18 September, when the chief of the Foreign Ministry's International Organizations Department was already in the Bulgarian mission in New York, and he showed no interest in me whatsoever. They had arranged to get rid of me, and my deputy was to prepare the documents.

[Badzheva] Do you expect President Zhelev to sign the decree for your dismissal, now that the government has dissociated itself from you in such a demonstrative manner?

[Pashovski] The situation can very easily be returned to normal by including me again as a permanent representative of our delegation, as is the case with all other states. If the present government wants to apply some sort of approaches of its own, it should explain why.

[Badzheva] Have you sought President Zhelev's support in this scandal between you and the government?

[Pashovski] I have sent all the materials to President Zhelev, and I sent them to the Foreign Ministry as well. President Zhelev and I also spoke very briefly on the telephone; he believed that the scandal should be avoided. However, I am against the use of the term "president's men." People do not belong to one baron or another. As for me, I am nobody's man.

[Badzheva] However, it was thanks to the president that you have stayed on so long in New York. You had problems with other governments as well, but Mr. Zhelev so far has refused to sign a decree relieving you from your post.

[Pashovski] I know nothing about the decree or anything else, but I do know that a struggle is under way to replace the party state with a parliamentary democracy based on a balance of forces.

[Badzheva] Will you submit your resignation as the Foreign Ministry wants?

[Pashovski] I have no intention of staying here, if this is what Mrs. Bokova wants to hear. However, a resignation is a definite political act. I have demonstrated to our public opinion that I can resign from posts that in some people's eyes are much more interesting than my present one. If I submit my resignation now, I will open the way for this outrageous behavior to continue that is appearing now in politics.

Recommissioning Checks To Start at Kozloduy Plant

AU2609084895 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2100 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have received an announcement from the Committee for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy that tomorrow checks will start on the No. 1 Reactor at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant to establish its readiness for recommissioning. The committee received a request from the Kozloduy Plant for a permit to be granted.

A commission of experts from the Inspectorate for the Safe Use of Nuclear Energy, which is the state body responsible for monitoring radiation and nuclear safety, will take part in the checks. The results of the checks are expected to be ready by the end of the week, when they also will be publicized.

As regards the conclusions from the tests conducted on the metal of the body of the No. 1 reactor that were carried out by Bulgarian scientists, they show that the reactor can be operated for a further period [words indistinct] which is of the order of seven or eight months.

Czechs Signal Intention To Join EU

MS2509192495 London INDEPENDENT in English 23 Sep 95 p 11

[Report by Adrian Bridge: "Czechs Stake Claim to Join EU Ahead of Rivals"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague—The Czech Republic yesterday signalled its intention to join the ever-lengthening queue of would-be members of the European Union by lodging in January its formal application to join.

Vaclav Klaus, the Prime Minister, said he planned to present his country's application during a visit to Rome shortly after Italy takes over the EU presidency at the beginning of the year. Next year will also see the opening of the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) looking into the question of EU expansion.

The Czech bid follows similar applications to join the EU from Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. But although apparently trailing their former Communist bloc allies in Central Europe, the Czechs believe they are likely to head straight to the top of the queue.

Mr Klaus, a right-wing economist who models himself on Baroness Thatcher, maintains that his country has long since outpaced its regional rivals on the road of political and economic reform. He suggests that the Czech Republic, with its balanced budget and low debt, is already outperforming some EU member states.

Like his mentor, Mr Klaus takes an extremely sceptical view of the EU, arguing that it is excessively interventionist.

Despite such criticisms, membership of the EU and Nato—remains the fundamental foreign policy goal of the Czech government. And there is widespread acknowledgement that the Czech Republic is likely to be among the first of any new entrants.

"On a macro-economic level, there is no doubt that the Czechs are ahead of others in the region," said an official at the EU delegation in Prague. "But it is still premature to say they are ready for membership now."

Political Analyst Assesses Coalition Problems

AU2009101795 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 16 Sep 95 p 13

[Interview with political scientist Istvan Schlett by Istvan Javorniczky; place and date not given: "Governing, Rather Than the Country, Is in Crisis—Istvan Schlett on Program Putsch, Technocrat Attitude, and Opposition in the Coalition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the past 14 months, the coalition partners have several times allowed citizens to witness their disagreements and, rather than dealing with them among themselves, they aired them in public. Most recently, the change of the governmental structure and a nominated minister created a storm and threatened to break up the coalition. What is the essence of the coalition debates, is it indeed what is being said in public, or is something else at stake? We interviewed political scientist Istvan Schlett on these issues.

[Schlett] According to the Hungarian constitutional order, rather than the government having a head, the prime minister has a government, puts together the team, and has no legal obligation whatsoever to justify the appointment or dismissal of a minister. This can at most have a political limit. Only his political judgment leads him to hold discussions with various wings of his own party and with the coalition partner before taking such steps. Therefore, as to the concrete subject of the debate, the disagreement makes no sense.

[Javorniczky] So why did the ideas on changing the government, nevertheless, create such a storm?

[Schlett] Because there is a permanent government crisis. Until now, it has not become clear what this government wants and what its program is. It seems as if the prime minister did not agree with his own decisions or with their consequences. He accepts some decisions for some reason and subsequently tries to correct them. However, I do not think that the prime minister's uncertainty is the only issue. There is no agreement within the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], either, and no agreement has been made between the coalition partners on the work of the government. In spite of its length, the coalition agreement does not clearly define the government's goals or deal with all the government's work. In the meantime, the government has come across several tasks that are not dealt with in the agreement, or their interpretation is disputed. Yet new debates keep emerging on these points, they become protracted owing to the mutual lack of trust, and they are conducted in public. The debates are constantly being restarted and the government cannot bring in predictable measures. In spite of the 72-percent majority, we do not have a stable and predictable government. The fact that coups can be staged against the government program at any time is turning into a basic experience for society. It is possible that the country would be in a better position if the program were less coherent in terms of economics, but were possible to be implemented because it had the political backing. In that case, people and the various social groups would be able to adjust to something and could count on the government as a stable factor. This way, they are forced to build their life strategies by leaving the government out. When a country has not been governed for a long time, sooner or later it becomes ungovernable.

[Javorniczky] What should the government do?

[Schlett] The prime minister's favorite saying is that "we will put the country in order" by 1998. This is not what a government's job is. It is not the government's job to put the country in order, rather to make itself suitable for carrying out the government's work. For example, it should be clarified who defines the government's strategy. It should be made clear whether the prime minister is capable of doing his job. If he cannot keep the government together and determine its image, if he cannot coordinate the work of the ministries, and if he cannot make the government credible and the government's activities predictable, then he is not suitable for this post. However, if he has the personal abilities for these, but certain people do not let him do his job, then it is again the prime minister's duty to remove the obstacles. If this is the coalition partner, then remove it, and if he has power groups within his party that are crippling him, then he must neutralize them. The prime minister is responsible for his government's activities formally and politically before parliament and the country.

[Javorniczky] What are the biggest problems?

[Schlett] The prime minister should coordinate the policies of the various ministries, because at the moment the government's decisions are contradictory and the ministries' activities do not form a governmental program. The finance minister has made himself practically independent. Resulting from a technocratic attitude, he only concentrates on the professional jobs demanded by the reorganization of the economy and does not take the social cost and political consequences of these into consideration. However, a prime minister cannot say, "Come what may, when can I at last return to business life?" In addition to being responsible for "putting the economy in order," he is also responsible for maintaining social peace, developing the cultural sphere and the educational system, ensuring local government's ability to function, and alleviating the regional differences, among other things. Furthermore, he has to ensure the achievement of the government's goals, rather than taking a stance in a professional debate. The prime minister cannot identify with a technocratic way of thinking and must be able to include these considerations in overall policy. In other words, he must create a feasible political program. For some reason, this is not happening. Instead, if I understood his intention with the economic minister correctly, the prime minister wants to handle the power conflict by setting up a counterweight for the finance minister in the government. This makes no sense, because, if he does not agree with his finance minister or cannot or does not want to accept the consequences, then the easiest thing would be to dismiss him and find someone else whose ideas could fit into his own political program.

[Javorniczky] A political attitude, which could be seen as a continuation of the chess game of Kadar [former communist party leader], could have led here, the constant balancing between the groups: He can remain important by playing off representatives of the various views against each other. The question is whether in the current circumstances this is viable politics or whether it will lead to paralyzing the government.

[Schlett] In my view, it is not viable because the political committee and the government or a parliamentary system are not identical organizations. It is possible that this is what Horn has learned and what he knows, but I would be surprised if he found this technique usable or expedient, because he must have noticed in the past five years that structural differences exist between the past and current methods of decisionmaking.

[Javorniczky] In the past four years, he has played the same chess game within his party—and with success.

[Schlett] However, in 14 months, he should have noticed that the attitudes and political style demanded by governing and the prime ministerial position are different from those of a party leader. I do not think that the prime minister does not know this.

[Javorniczky] Then why does he still use such methods?

[Schlett] In my view, he feels himself trapped. He might be acting under external pressures. It is possible that he would have broken up the coalition long ago if it had been up to him, but he cannot do it for some reason. I can keep guessing but it is easier to say that I do not know.

[Javorniczky] The prime minister has pointed out the difference between the situation of the Hungarian and that of Western governments by saying that here the government has to modernize and handle a crisis at the same time.

[Schlett] In fact, in addition to economic modernization and crisis management, it also has to maintain the most important social systems until new ones are created in their place.

[Javorniczky] This is when people say that the government does not have an image of the future.

[Schlett] Rather, it does not have an image of tomorrow.

[Javorniczky] The question is if it could have one in the current situation.

[Schlett] It is possible that it could not have one, but it needs to. On the level of debates and theories, this is said to be the difference between gradualness or shock therapy. I do not think that this alternative is realistic in politics. I repeat that, in the course of governing, a viable program has to be created rather than theoretical problems solved. This is the politicians' job and they cannot pass this on to theoreticians or to technocrats. They have to find a feasible way, taking the circumstances and the means available into consideration. For example, in a constitutional state and under democratic circumstances, there is no point in making up plans whose implementation would require a dictatorship, no matter how rational the modernization ideas might be.

[Javorniczky] Is there a chance to form a viable coalition or will we be getting used to this government's style of quarrels and suspicions?

[Schlett] The coalition partners represent irreconcilable philosophies from many points of view, but the problem is that they are unable to form a joint program for a whole cycle. They are afraid of each other, which also means that they paralyze each other. What I have said about the prime minister I can also say about the coalition partner, namely that it should come to a decision. It should decide whether it really wants to be in coalition with a party that it might not like and in a government that is led by a prime minister whom it does not like. It can freely make a decision on this. However, if it decides to remain in the coalition, it should strive for a joint program that it can also accept, rather than preventing decisions that it does not like. Opposition within the government leads to inability to act.

[Javorniczky] They both seem to hope that somehow they will be able to force their will on the other.

[Schlett] Or they try to divide things up and give a free hand to each other in their areas, but tend not to adhere to these agreements.

[Javorniczky] Could it be at all possible to find a common denominator?

[Schlett] To achieve this, both parties would have to reduce their demands. They would have to take it into consideration just how much can be solved within one government cycle. It would probably be a good idea for them not to take on too many conflicts at the same time. They should decide what the pressing and urgent changes are, otherwise the processes will become unmanageable and the government will not have enough means to influence them.

[Javorniczky] What interests and rational consideration hold the coalition together? The more two parties govern together, the harder it is for them to separate, especially because the financial situation of party experts who have various positions and roles would be significantly affected.

[Schlett] In my view, fear of the conditions after the breaking up of the coalition is one of the cohesive forces. The MSZP does not need the kind of opposition that the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] would be. It seems that the Socialists are also convinced that the SZDSZ controls a large section of the media. They feel that the media and opinion-forming intellectuals do not sufficiently support the government and they are probably worried that, in opposition, the SZDSZ would "give a free hand" to the already critical media. In 14 months in government they must have gained some unsavory information about each other, and this could be leaked, and so on. They are worried that three years of governing alone would be like running the gauntlet. These kinds of nightmares might be haunting the Socialists, but the SZDSZ is not completely at ease, either: Will their parliamentary background, media background, and their relations with opinion-forming intellectuals be enough to defend their acquired positions?

In my view, we are justified in thinking that all the current opposition parties would now happily support the MSZP in taking these positions away. And what they would lose is not the only point. What would an SZDSZ back in opposition do in the coming one or two years? How and why could it criticize the government? For example, if they started to criticize the government for social insensitivity in the budget debate, their speech would be drowned in laughter. The SZDSZ is not suitable for the kind of role in which Torgyan [chairman of the Independent Smallholders Party] is excellent—he had no qualms about denouncing the Antall government the day after his party had left it, as if it had never had anything to do with it. In other words, it would not be easy for them to adjust to the new situation; with the Bokros program, it would be very difficult to be successful at the elections.

[Javorniczky] How will the talks end, will their obstinate opposition to each other become resolved? Will they be able to accept that they are in coalition with each other and that this has implications?

[Schlett] Last summer, when the coalition was formed, I wrote that forming a coalition has advantages and disadvantages for the parties and they should not forget about the latter when they make their assessments. However, according to the indications, neither of the parties really accepted the disadvantages that are part of the decision. This, in turn, makes the government unable to act. The fact that they want to outdo each other can be said to be natural because they are competitors at the elections, but it is a problem if this mentality paralyzes the government. They say that maintaining the coalition is in the country's interest. In my view, the country's interest is that the government should govern. They should at last hold a program debate to see if they can form a joint government program. If they can, they should form it and implement it, but if they cannot, they should seek another solution. In my view, rather than the country or parliament, it is the government that is in crisis. This is bad because certain work can only be done by a government able to act.

Izetbegovic Says 'New Paper' To Be Revealed

AU2509194295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Sep 95

[Report by Senada Cumurovic on the statements by Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency following the talks with U.S. envoys Roberts Owen and Chris Hill in Sarajevo on 25 September—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cumurovic] The talks between Bosnia-Herzegovina officials Izetbegovic and Silajdzic and U.S. negotiating team members Owen and Hill, which lasted several hours, resulted in the decision that our delegation will travel to New York for the resumption of the peace talks, after some important issues connected to the Geneva principles have been clarified. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic explained this to reporters:

[Silajdzic] Bosnia-Herzegovina continues its legal existence, which means that it will have its parliament, its constitution, of course, its presidency, and government. Today's meeting and the document here confirm this, and that is very important. Now we can attend the meeting in New York tomorrow.

Last night this was not the case. We had problems with this paper, since the things I am talking about had not been confirmed. Now we can attend the meeting.

[Cumurovic] The American, Roberts Owen, uttered only two sentences to the effect that the talks were important, and that progress had been made, but that much remained to be done. Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, presented more details from today's talks with the U.S. delegation. He addressed the reporters later, mentioning—as he said—a paper that would be revealed in New York tomorrow, and which clarifies certain principles.

[Izetbegovic] Following our statement last night that the New York meeting was under a question mark, the U.S. delegation returned to Bosnia—I think they were already over the ocean—and today we held long talks with them, over four hours, and we put together a new paper, which is somewhat shorter than the one put together in Belgrade. The Belgrade one was—to put it this way—a long step in the wrong direction, while this one is a short step in the right direction.

This paper is now going to New York. It will be revealed tomorrow, so you will see the details. It essentially represents an elaboration of the first point of the Geneva principles that speak of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and integral state within its international borders. This is an issue of the institutions of this state, what it will look like after the elections. This is all about its institutions. True, these are all general stipulations so far. The details have been omitted since they were disputed.

Much of this paper refers to future elections. The principle of these elections had previously been ill-defined in Belgrade. We insist on the so-called popular vote, as the Americans would say, that is, on delegates that would emerge from such elections, and not some kind of appointed delegates. This principle has now been included in the paper, which is important. It confirms in a way the implementation of democracy in the future Bosnia-Herzegovina, including in the parts where it does not exist today. This principle, as you know, existed in the Geneva paper in points four and four, and it was put in there at our request. We think that all this affirms the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Points From Sarajevo Accord Leading to Talks

AU2509211195 Paris AFP in English 2012 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, 25 (AFP)—The following are some of the chief points of the agreement negotiated by the United States envoys Christopher Hill and Roberts Owen in Belgrade on Sunday and Sarajevo on Monday [25 September].

The agreement led the Bosnian Government to reverse its decision to boycott the meeting of foreign ministers from Bosnia, Croatia and rump Yugoslavia planned for Tuesday in New York. —the two entities (the Croat-Bosnian federation and the Bosnian Serbs) will honour Bosnia's international obligations as long as it is not a question of a financial obligation contracted by one entity without the agreement of the other. —elections should take place in each entity once social conditions allow it. In order to make such elections as democratic as possible the following measures shall be adopted in each entity:

1) freedom of movement, the right of refugees or displaced persons to return to their homes and take back possession of their goods or to receive just compensation, freedom of speech and the press and the protection of human rights.

2) the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OCSE) shall have representatives in the chief towns of Bosnia.

3) thirty days after the OCSE gives a green light for the holding of elections in each of the two entities the governments shall organize elections. —the actions and obligations of Bosnia must be financed by the Croat-Bosnian federation and the Bosnian Serbs.

The basic principles agreed between the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia in Geneva on September 8 said that Bosnia would continue its legal existence within its present borders.

They also guaranteed continuing international recognition for the state, while specifying that it could consist of two entities—the so-called Republika Srpska (RS) and the Moslem-Croat federation.

After the Bosnian threat to boycott the New York meeting, Owen and Hill came to Sarajevo and spent four hours talking to Bosnian officials, including President Alija Izetbegovic and premier Haris Silajdzic.

The talks led to an agreement which Izetbegovic described as an "elaboration of Article 1 of the Geneva agreement."

It "confirms that the minimum of the state structure will remain there—meaning that Bosnia has the constitution, parliament, presidency and government and all the attributes of the state," Silajdzic said on Monday.

He noted that the paper implied that the republic's parliament and the presidency will be in charge of foreign relations and foreign policy of the republic.

Policy guidelines will be created by its members, and not by the separate parliaments of the entities.

The Bosnians accepted to go to talks in New York Tuesday because the paper is "a step in the right direction," Izetbegovic said.

Izetbegovic on Talks With Vranitzky, Wiesenthal

AU2209160395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Sep 95

[Report by Mirad Obradovic from Vienna]

[FBIS Translated Text] Leaving the Austrian capital, President Izetbegovic met with Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky today. Giving full support to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chancellor Vranitzky offered President Izetbegovic to convey his messages to the European summit of the chiefs of governments in Mallorca.

As a great friend of our country, Austria is offering full economic assistance in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As [words indistinct], President Izetbegovic [words indistinct] restored hopes to not only refugees but the people in Bosnia, too. Austrian Federal Chancellor Vranitzky emphasized that the economic assistance will primarily depend on the development of democracy in the part of the so-called Serbian entity, namely, observation of human rights, [word indistinct] of refugees and their return home.

[Words indistinct] this morning. President Izetbegovic received Mr. Simon Wiesenthal, human rights fighter and an even more famous hunter of war criminals. Giving a full support to President Izetbegovic and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Wiesenthal in the talks particularly emphasized that war crimes never grow old. The man who dedicated his life to the struggle for a more humane society will speak about war criminals, as he said, at the [word indistinct] of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. [Word indistinct], Wiesenthal also said that a special attention should be paid to young people. Within this context it is very important that young people should know that there can be no future if one has committed a crime or cooperated in it. After Vienna, President Izetbegovic travelled to Zagreb.

Silajdzic Certain Bosnia To Remain Single State

AU2509221095 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2116 GMT 25 Sep 95

[Interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by news moderator Robert Hochner; Silajdzic in the studio in Saraejvo—live; Silajdzic statements in English with simultaneous German translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Hochner] Good evening, Mr. Prime Minister.

[Silajdzic] Good evening.

[Hochner] Mr. Prime Minister, we were told that shortly before this cast you received an important call from the Presidency. Was this something that is of importance for the peace process in Bosnia?

[Silajdzic] Yes, it involved the peace talks in Bosnia. You know that we had talks with the U.S. delegation today. The U.S. side knew that we were not satisfied with the talks in Belgrade. What is involved here? It is our state. We have a state right now, we have a Constitution, we have our parliament, we have the Presidency, the cabinet, and the government. And this must remain so. Our state must continue. The government in Belgrade wants to reduce us to a size that would no longer correspond to a state. They are now trying to achieve diplomatically what they have been unable to achieve by military means. This would kill Bosnia.

[Hochner] Mr. Prime Minister, one gets the impression that the Bosnian Government is now making more demands because it has had great military successes over the past three weeks and, therefore, wants to make greater political demands. Is this possible? Are you not risking giving rise to massive U.S. pressure?

[Silajdzic] I do not think that we are making any greater demands. We only ask for a minimum. We have a state, and this state must continue. This is what we agreed in Geneva. We must have our parliament, our Presidency in line with our system, and our government—of course in accordance with an amended Constitution. These bodies must have their powers. We cannot be satisfied with saying that there is a sovereign Bosnia and an internal Bosnia. There must be bodies that are responsible for sovereignty and that secure our territory in accordance with the Constitution.

[Hochner] It is difficult to believe that a state, a common state, can be viable when two ethnic groups of this state—namely the Muslims and the Serbs—are now still fighting each other. You say that this is supposed to be a single state despite everything.

[Silajdzic] Well, we have had wars before in all parts of the world, and there are still states. Bosnia is a multiethnic, multicultural state. For us and for me this is a privilege. For the Serb fascists this is unacceptable, but I believe that the multiethnic, multicultural character will be preserved in the future. No matter what anyone may think and believe, Bosnia will remain one single state, a member of the international community. This is not called into question by anyone, except for the regime in Belgrade, which wants to extend its territory to Bosnia-Herzegovina. They want to see a new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which can be divided easily, and the other half is then supposed to go to a Greater Serbia. I am not against a Greater Serbia within its own borders, but not at our cost.

[Hochner] Mr. Prime Minister, thank you very much for this interview. Good evening to Sarajevo.

Presidency Member Criticizes U.S. Peace Plan

AU2609113895 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 21-28 Sep 95 p 21

[Interview with Nijaz Durakovic, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and chairman of the Social Democratic Party, by Sead Luckin; place and date not given: "To Preserve the State and the People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nijaz Durakovic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and chairman of the Social Democratic Party [SDP], is one of those politicians who have taken all the peace plans so far with a pinch of salt. In the case of the latest, the U.S. peace initiative, the party of which he is the chairman has pointed out that the initiative makes possible the legalization of the so-called Serb Republic, which indirectly means also the occupation of parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Luckin] After the first round of negotiations, the basic principles of the U.S. peace initiative are now coming to light. In view of the skepticism with which the SDP received the Geneva agreement, can it be the basis for reaching the final peace settlement and, after that, for the reintegration of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Dizdarevic] In all the peace plans and initiatives so far, the aggressor has been, either explicitly or implicitly, more or less rewarded. He has been rewarded this time as well, and not only because of the acceptance of the hated term Serb Republic, but also because, as a matter of fact, the Contact Group plan has been given up, the plan that was offered to us and that we, although aware of all its deficiencies, accepted. It is symptomatic that, in the peace initiative, everybody is talking of a ratio of 51 to 49. But it is being said that this ratio is the basis for negotiations, which, in my opinion, will cause many problems. Karadzic is already bargaining in a megalomaniacal way, and demanding what nobody can give him: the entire Podrinje [Drina River valley], the widening of the corridor through Posavina [Sava River valley] at least by 20 km, much of Bosnian Krajina, the Sana River valley, and all, or at least half, of Sarajevo. He even demands access to the sea, 12 km of the coast, and the partition of Neum, all the way up to the Neretva River delta. He could probably fit this in with the 49 percent, and I am afraid that in those bargains we would be offered—excuse my language—some Godforsaken places, starting with Kupres, and beyond.

I therefore believe that the negotiations will stumble precisely over those bargains, and the question is whether, behind the U.S. initiative, there is still the ambition to divide Bosnia along ethnic lines. The question is also whether this state within a state will be viable, with two constitutions, two economies, and the possibility of the Serb parastate linking up with Serbia, that is, Yugoslavia. Those so-called special links are rather doubtful. They may, for instance, be an equivalent to the relations that, realistically speaking, Herzeg-Bosnia has today with the Republic of Croatia.

To Prevent Ethnic Division

[Luckin] Then what is the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in what way is this knot to be undone?

[Durakovic] In my personal opinion, and that is the attitude of the SDP, we support a federal system for the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. In principle, those should be the relations that have already been established in the Bosnian-Croatian federation. It should also be extended to those of the Serbian people who thinks of Bosnia-Herzegovina as their fatherland. A transitional period could be introduced for the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina that is now controlled by the war criminals in Pale, and time coul be given to allow for the spontaneous reintegration of the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am convinced that only in such a way can the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines be avoided. Otherwise, I think that, in view of the aspirations on both sides and the apparent national homogenization with a tendency to dissolution and secession, and even considering the unclear attitude of the Western powers, of which many see a way out in the final partition, it will be difficult to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is clear that we must seek a peace settlement, but not at any price. We need a just peace, rather than a peace in which we will lose both the state and the people, as well as the possibility of the refugees' return to the places from where they were expelled.

[Luckin] To what degree can peace and time really be decisive factors in the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina? It seems that those are the arguments that our negotiating team is counting on most.

[Durakovic] It is high time we for us to tell the world in a more adamant way that the latest plan is a reward to the aggressor again. Nobody has the right to give away territories that used to be predominantly Bosniak-populated, and all the victims so far must not be forgotten. Nevertheless, all this should be viewed from some kind of historic perspective as well. That fascist parastate will not live for ever. One day, forces will arise within the Serbian people itself that will be ashamed of this planetary crime and that will pursue a different policy, one of cohabitation, tolerance, and understanding.

Without Trading Territories

[Luckin] In your opinion, what are the conditions that make possible the continuation of the idea of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Durakovic] The first and basic thing is that, in the coming negotiations, we reject the constitution of parallel, fully rounded-off nation states. Everything should be done through ancillary mechanisms to prevent the secession of the so-called Serb Republic, or its establishment as a fully fledged state on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Second, one ought not to accept large-scale trading in territories. Only smaller adjustments regarding communications are possible. Third, we must urgently intensify activities aimed at establishing the Federation, and resolve the problem of the existence of Herzeg-Bosnia. Fourth, as soon as possible, one should develop a concept of constitutional mechanisms that would anticipate a transitional period, with the goal of federalizing the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina and the adoption of a system based on federal principles. This would apply to all its peoples and the entire territory. Within that a constitutional and political system could be found through political negotiations that would settle this delicate situation. In any case, the new constitution of the republic is to be passed, which would not only legally sanction the new situation, but would also prejudge it.

Have They Sold Us Out?

[Luckin] Do you think that those are the elements that make it possible for us to think about the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina in some 20 to 30 years?

[Durakovic] I have heard that Izetbegovic reckons on those 20 to 30 years, but I think the reconstruction should be completed much earlier. In this region, things happen—from the historic point of view—far more rapidly. If we draw a historic parallel, the period between 1941 and 1945 was a catastrophe, and yet some solutions were found soon. It is because of our people, who have big hearts and sometimes, I guess unjustifiably, they forget certain things too quickly, although I think that we can forgive, but we can never forget. It is too long a period to talk about decades. I think that the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina could possibly start soon, in several years. The first precondition is that the fascist regimes in Serbia and Pale should fall. Then the economy would do its part of the job. I believe in the power of the economy. The West has a moral obligation to help us, and it has to do so in order to purify its stained credibility. There are some friendly countries that are ready to help us. Therefore, we can be more optimistic—I see Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly Sarajevo, as a new Singapore.

[Luckin] As our talk drew to its end, Durakovic added: "Of course, provided we have not been sold out yet."

[Box, p 21]

[Durakovic] The Croatian policy is still puzzling. One hears, and in the West a lot has been written about it, that there is some map of Tudjman's in which he generously cedes to the chetniks precisely those territories in which the Bosniaks used to be in a majority. There are rumors about a deal regarding the entire Posavina, the Sana River valley up to Prijedor and Podrinje, that would be given to the Serbs, while Tudjman aspires to secure the Dalmatian hinterland from Livno to Bihac, as well as to expand from Stolac over Ravno to Trebinje, in order to secure the Dubrovnik coast. In the West, those maps are seen in the light of some earlier agreements with Milosevic, and additionally, with revived greater Croatian ambitions. It is certain that it will be one of the key factors in the realization of this peace initiative and that the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, if we want it to be an integral and internationally recognized state, will largely depend on its relations with Herzeg-Bosnia on one side, and Croatia on the other, as well as on the ways in which the question of the Federation's operation will be settled.

Sacirbegovic Insists on Central Authorities' Powers

AU2509202295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Sep 95

[Report including interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic in New York on 25 September, by Envera Selimovic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Selimovic] Our delegation finds the constitutional arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina the most disputed issue. Our government demands guarantees, and precisely defined principles that would remove the dilemmas and fears of the division of Bosnia, Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic says.

An integral Bosnia must exist with all the institutions that confirm such a status. This would be an interim solution until new democratic elections can be held. This state must have all the prerogatives of an integral and sovereign state, Minister Sacirbegovic adds, saying that this opens a series of problems.

[Sacirbegovic] There is a problem in this whole process, and that is that we are negotiating with war criminals, with people who have no feeling for democracy, and who are ultimately dictators. We are supposed to reach an agreement with them on a future Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would be a democratic state on its entire territory, including the so-called Serb Republic, where human rights would be respected, and where conditions would be created for the return of the refugees. The war criminals would then be sent to face the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

It is clear that people like Mladic and Karadzic will not find it easy to agree on democratic institutions and institutions that will respect human rights if they understand that this means their political end and imprisonment.

[Selimovic] What is the most disputed issue? What endangers most directly the sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Sacirbegovic] The other side's negotiators are trying to avoid any [words indistinct] of democratic institutions that would be elected by the people. We will not accept that. Second, they are trying to keep the Bosnia-Herzegovina institutions to the absolute minimum, and third, they are insisting on Bosnia- Herzegovina not having a legal integrity, but instead they want it to be a mere union of two entities. That is certainly not in accordance with what we agreed in Geneva. We will not allow confusion to creep in in New York. We will be very clear that there will be one Bosnia-Herzegovina in the future, and that this Bosnia-Herzegovina will have central authorities with powers that are in accordance with the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of our state, with human rights' respect, and true democracy.

[Selimovic] [passage omitted]

Sacirbegovic Views International Aspects of War

MM2609091295 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 25 Sep 95 p 5

[Interview with Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic by Avshin Mawlawi in Washington; date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mawlawi] Is the Bosnian war an ethnic-religious war?

[Sacirbegovic] This conflict is not new and I do not think it is an ethnic conflict. In essence I think it is a political conflict, and all the talk about its being an ethnic conflict is only a pretext used by the major capitals to justify their reluctance to do anything about it. Describing it as an ethnic conflict gives rationality to their reluctance or inaction.

But the fact is that the Bosnian question is one of flagrant aggression and flagrant annihilation, which demanded greater commitment from the international community. Referring to it as a mere ethnic conflict, in my opinion, was only a ploy to justify their reluctance to confront the bitter reality there.

[Mawlawi] What lessons have you learned from this war, which has been raging for 41 months?

[Sacirbegovic] The first message that resulted from the Bosnian war was that the Bosnians were Muslims and so were not fully European, or were less European. This situation implies a negative aspect, according to some people's way of thinking. The second message is that the principles of international law and security could be selectively applied.

I recall what an honest and well-informed European diplomat told me openly in November 1992: "If the victims in Bosnia were Christians and the killers were Muslims, Europe's response would have been completely different."

It is evident that such a statement indicates a specific method of discrepancy and inequality. This discrepancy, and not merely the fact that the majority of the victims are Muslims, is something which deserves a response from the Islamic world.

On some occasions the Islamic world has felt that it should speak out in defense of the Bosnians on the grounds that they were Muslims, but in fact it did not really want to turn the war into a religious war. For this reason the response of many has been slow. For our part, we refused to accept the idea that the war was a religious one.

We have appealed to the Islamic countries and tried to rouse them to come to our help, not only because many of us here are Muslims but also because our cause involves injustice and inequality in the application of international law and in international behavior.

This state of affairs constituted an injustice not only to the Muslims alone but also to the concepts of the international system and the new international order.

Some countries were very quick to realize this injustice, such as those countries which have similar characteristics to those of Bosnia, like Malaysia for example, which has an Islamic majority coexisting with several non-Muslim communities. The Malaysians have realized the dangers inherent in this double-dealing criterion because it directly reflects on them too.

[Mawlawi] How do you explain the European attitude of allowing the Bosnian war to continue all this time?

[Sacirbegovic] The attitude of Europe toward the Bosnian Muslims was to a certain extent surprising. But, on the other hand, Europe thought of its past identity, within the framework of small nation states. Europe is more attached to this than the United States.

Europe may be a highly advanced society in terms of technology, indeed even in terms of political thinking, but it has never succeeded in overcoming its limitations as a continent consisting of relatively small nation states.

Europe has not been able to adapt well to a multiplicity of cultures. If you look at the conditions now prevailing in many West European countries, you find that they consider anyone not born within that nation as a second-class citizen, and this applies to Muslims in particular, even to the second generation of Muslims in those countries on whose territories they were born.

This concept is in total contradiction to the concept on which the United States stands. The European mentality is opposed to the ideal of multiethnic societies, even in Asia or the Middle East. This is one of the reasons why we enjoy greater sympathy from countries such as the United States and the Asian and Middle East countries.

[Mawlawi] How do you evaluate the role of the United Nations?

[Sacirbegovic] If we look back at the history of the United Nations we will find, I believe, that the United Nations remained dormant for a very long period of time with regard to matters of international peace and security. In fact it was mere ornamental decor. The majority of resolutions adopted used to fall within the sphere of confrontation between the big powers.

When the confrontation dialogue between the big powers changed in the wake of the collapse of communism and the demolition of the Berlin Wall, the United Nations got the opportunity to become something new, something creative, compatible with the new era. Unfortunately many of the big powers, particularly those in Europe, look upon the United Nations as an organization that can be manipulated to serve their short-term, selfish objectives.

The result of this is that they have transformed the United Nations into a scapegoat for themselves. These united nations have snatched the UN institutions in practice to use them in evading individual responsibility and laying part of the responsibility for what is taking place in Bosnia on the shoulders of the United Nations.

Furthermore, the UN secretary general used to say sometimes that the effectiveness of the United Nations stems from the effectiveness of its member countries. But I believe that the UN secretary general was fully prepared to let the United Nations be snatched up in this manner by its strong member countries. He has often copied the speech of these capitals instead of challenging them, involving them, or leading them

The UN institutions suffer from one grave problem. Basically, the Security Council is a club for the major powers, who are equal among themselves. There can be no justification for this except if the Council's strong members are prepared to assume greater responsibilities than they shoulder now.

With regard to Bosnia they cited the absence of a strategic interest and so did not send sufficient forces in an effective manner. However, it proved in the end that they did have a strategic interest in Bosnia in terms of exactly those institutions, namely NATO, the United Nations, and others.

Their reluctance, or the inadequacy of their measures, has weakened their strategic interests within those institutions. Part of their desire to help stems from their feeling that the United Nations must regain its credibility.

[Mawlawi] What about NATO's performance in the Bosnian crisis?

[Sacirbegovic] Some institutions [as published] tied NATO's hands by linking it to the inefficient, bureaucratic UN administration. Whenever NATO wanted to act, it had first to pass through the UN bureaucratic channels before it could act. Thus NATO was drastically weakened.

[Mawlawi] Do you think that American intervention was what caused the change in the equation?

[Sacirbegovic] In many of its aspects the American position has been defined by internal political considerations as well as by the failure to assume well-entrenched responsibility for the situation, because the Americans did not realize that Europe would be so grossly weak. The United States failed to see that Europe cannot act as one single political entity and that, in fact, it consists of several political units that are incapable of coming up with a comprehensive and united policy.

[Mawlawi] Many circles say that, had former U.S. President George Bush been in power now, he would have dealt differently with the Bosnian crisis. What do you think?

[Sacirbegovic] In comparing President Bush and President Clinton I can see no big difference. The U.S. policy of avoiding responsibility was based on the theory that Bosnia did not involve any strategic interest. So when the Bosnia question became of strategic importance, because it began to pose a threat to the international institutions, the Clinton Administration took some action. In the light of this scenario, it is very unlikely that the Bush Administration would have acted differently.

[Mawlawi] Do you trust Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic as interlocutor on behalf of the Serbs?

[Sacirbegovic] Milosevic is a deceiving butcher. But at the same time he is a person with whom we have to deal whether we like it or not. It is clear that Milosevic is the person on whom the West pins its hopes of curbing and controlling more dangerous and more recalcitrant forces. But we must not lose sight of the fact that Milosevic was the person who really started this tragedy. He is Dr. Frankenstein, who created the beast. Thus he is still the beast gentleman.

Karadzic and other Serbian butchers are now wanted for trial before the courts for their war crimes. We will never forgive them in any way whatsoever. They must face the courts. Indeed, we cannot enjoy peace as long as these men remain free. The question is one not of racial conflict but of a sinister plot by people who drew plans for mass-annihilation crimes and carried them out most abominably. For this reason, justice must take its course.

Army, HVO Hold Over 51 Percent of Country

AU2509163695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 25 Sep 95

[Report by Samir Huseinovic on the news conference by Ferid Buljubasic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff spokesman, in Sarajevo on 25 September—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Huseinovic] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has retained the tactical and operative initiative, thus creating favorable conditions for further liberation operations. Ferid Buljubasic had this to say about the situation on the Bosnia-Herzegovina fronts:

[Buljubasic] The units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army hold the operative and tactical initiative on all the fronts. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units are continuing to score successes, but last week these successes were on a somewhat smaller scale in comparison to the week from 11 to 17 September, when an occupied town was liberated almost daily.

Another feature of last week was that—on all the fronts where offensive operations were under way, that is from Mt. Ozren to Mt. Vlasic, to the Donji Vakuf front, which has now been moved to Skender Vakuf, and in the 5th Corps theater of operations—the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units demonstrated that they were very motivated, well led, and also that they have reached combat maturity in a way.

[Huseinovic] During the liberation operations the fighters of our Army—as it turned out after the mopping-up on the ground—have seized a large amount of weapons, which has reduced our disadvantage in arms and equipment that was so obvious at the beginning.

Speaking about the newly liberated territory in percentages, Buljubasic stressed:

[Buljubasic] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council have under their control over 51 percent of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is extremely important as the psychological barrier of 50 percent has been overcome. Now the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army control over 30 percent of the territory, of which 48 percent of the overall Bosnia-Herzegovina population—that is, about 2 million people—used to live before the war. This speaks volumes about the quality of the territory that is under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army since population density is one of the measures of the quality of territory.

[Huseinovic] The aggressor's operations are characterized by force maneuvering to support the routed aggressor's units, including the reinforcements arriving from Serbia. About 2,500 men sent as assistance to the aggressor is proof of the active involvement of the so-called FRY in the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite everything, the 5th Corps units, which have liberated over 3,000 square kilometers of territory, are now at the access points to Bosanski Novi, and they have also captured a part of Mt. Majdan in the direction of Prijedor. The front line has been consolidated in the direction of Sanski Most and Banja Luka, and the combat operations have now shifted to the territory of the Banja Luka municipality.

Following the liberation of Donji Vakuf the 7th Corps has stabilized the front line, which is now on the slopes of Ravna Planina. The liberation operations of the 2d and 3d Army Corps are still under way, and the two corps are getting closer and closer to Doboj.

Another question raised at the news conference was about the issue of Sarajevo. Following the partial withdrawal of the chetnik artillery from the Sarajevo exclusion zone, leaving some 100 pieces of over 12.7-mm caliber behind, and the weak attempt at lifting the blockade of the city, Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff spokesman said:

[Buljubasic] This is what it means: First, the danger to the city of Sarajevo has not been removed, and the city of Sarajevo, its civilians, the most urbane part of the city is still under threat of artillery, and possible new massacres. Second, the blockade of Sarajevo has not been lifted. Sarajevo is still in military terms a blocked and besieged city, and it will remain so as long as the chetniks are in Vrace, at Osmice, Spicasta Stijena, and so on. Even if they had removed all their artillery, from these positions they still represent a threat to the city, and the city remains under siege as there are no open roads leading in and out of Sarajevo, and there is no freedom of movement, as there is no free access and exit to the city. Sarajevo therefore remains in the center of the political struggle aimed at having the NATO ultimatum met. You have also seen that the Geneva principles on Sarajevo do not indicate anything about it being a unified city, which is our minimum, and something that our political representatives will demand and insist on at all the negotiations.

Zubak Views Peace Plan, Links to Croatia

AU2609113595 Zagreb VELEBIT in Serbo-Croatian 22 Sep 95 p 6

[Interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Jozo Curic; place and date not given: "The Final Peace Is Nearing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Curic] Mr. President, are the military actions by the Croatian forces a contribution to peace, or have they additionally endangered the prospects for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zubak] The activities of the Croatian forces have only accelerated the search for agreement and mutual understanding, and eventually the war will be ended by an agreement. The military activities have only accelerated the process of coming to a real peace. In view of the earlier balance of power, when the Serbs used to hold dominant positions, it was hard to expect, given such unbalance, that the Serbs would agree to any initiative made by the international community for peaceful settlement of the crisis, and not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in Croatia. The fact is that with the weakening of the Serbian positions preconditions are met for the Serbs to assess their possibilities in a more realistic way, and given a more balanced power structure, to sit down at the negotiating table and reach the final peace settlement.

[Curic] Was one of NATO's goals to make the Serbs willing to negotiate?

[Zubak] In all the talks I held so far with Mr. Holbrooke and the U.S. delegation that is working on this peace initiative, we were reassured that the NATO actions had nothing to do with the peace initiative, that is, the process initiated to restore peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Those actions were taken after the Serbian refusal to comply with the decisions made by the UN Security Council, demanding full safety for the safe areas. The direct motive was the latest massacre in Sarajevo. On the other hand, it seems that the NATO actions have considerably encouraged the actions taken by the Croatian forces and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been brought into such a position that they have to take a serious approach to the peace negotiations.

[Curic] Would you please explain the fundamental principles of the peace initiative?

[Zubak] It has seven principles. The first principle is that peace must be broadly established, that is, the crisis must be resolved not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia, and in the region of former Yugoslavia in general. There have been visits to Macedonia [The

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Greece, and Turkey. Simultaneously with resolving the Bosnian crisis and the question of the territorial integrity in Croatia, one ought to resolve the problems in the relations between Macedonia and Greece, and so forth. Which is to say, it is a broad peace plan. Second, it is based on the territorial integrity of the former republics, now being internationally recognized states. Third, it also anticipates the settlement of the question of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Srem. Fourth, the plan deals with the question of the future constitutional organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The fifth principle has to do with the question of territorial demarcation within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the sixth principle deals with the question of sanctions against the FRY, while the seventh principle regards economic reconstruction in the region. Which means that the international community is contemplating already now how everything that has been devastated in the war should be reconstructed in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the first place, and also to help rebuild the economy in the broader region, which means in Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro as well. However, when speaking about the seventh principle, for the time being one can talk in more clear terms only about the ways of aiding the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while everything else is about some general attitudes.

[Curic] What is the position of Posavina [River Sava basin] like, with regard to the peace initiative and the latest events?

[Zubak] Posavina is not particularly mentioned in the peace agreement, but a part of the agreement refers to the territorial demarcation. Within the territorial demarcation, which has only been touched upon, the question of Posavina is certainly considered; it arises in the constellation of the territorial rearrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the talks I took part in Mr. Holbrooke and his team did not propose any new map with regard to the one by the Contact Group that had already been accepted. They told us that, among other things, the Serbs were raising a question over the corridor in the region of Brcko, which means only in that area, rather than in its entire length, and they said that while drawing new demarcation lines one should keep in mind the concrete situation on the ground.

The corridor at Brcko has been reduced to the minimal width of a road, although the Serbs would want a wider one. At the time when the initiative was launched Zepa and Srebrenica fell, while Glamoc and Grahovo were freed. Since then the situation has considerably changed, and it is drawing near to the ratio proposed by the Contact Group plan. It is said that the principle 51 to 49 of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be called into question. The official attitude of us, who represent the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is that with regard to Posavina our attitude is based on what the Constitutional Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina has verified, which is the Washington agreement, and within it also the Vienna agreement, that anticipated the Federation to be organized according to the 58 to 42 ratio. In that option the corridor did not exist. After that the Constitutional assembly accepted the Contact Group's plan that anticipated 51, rather than 58 percent, and also the corridor. Our stance is that the question of Posavina should be resolved in the way proposed by the Contact Group's plan, which does not mean that in some new talks and negotiations we cannot look for, perhaps, some more favorable positions than those we have now, or that within the integral settlement of that issue, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also with regard to the strategic interest of Croatia, we could not discuss some other forms of corridor, and so forth. Political tensions have intensified with regard to the issue of Posavina, but the situation should not be dramatized, because we have not yet started the talks about the final territorial demarcation.

[Curic] How do you comment on certain statements that the Croatian forces will have to cede back the territories they have liberated?

[Zubak] When I spoke about Posavina I said it was still too early to talk about maps. There are many questions. One cannot successfully resolve the question of maps in Bosnia-Herzegovina without successfully resolving the question of eastern Slavonia. All those issues go in a single package: the major item is the general settlement of the crisis in the states of former Yugoslavia. It is still too early to say, but I doubt that we shall give up what we have liberated. In any case we shall take maximal care about the interests of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian interests in general. A series of talks is being held in Zagreb, Sarajevo, Belgrade, and other places. The agreement on basic principles of the future constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been partly accomplished, while six other issues are still being discussed. The talks about the constitutional arrangement will be continued, because just basic constitutional principles have been agreed upon.

[Curic] The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will link up with the Republic of Croatia. The Federation cannot exist without the confederation....

[Zubak] ...no matter what the map of the Federation may look like! Bosnia-Herzegovina has such a geopolitical position that it cannot function without Croatia. It is a unique geopolitical space. We are completely linked up both in terms of economy and traffic, while Bosnia-Herzegovina wants to be part of the industrialized West. What the forms of mutual linkage will be was not even defined in Washington. There it was said that the content of confederal links will be decided upon only after the final peace agreement is signed for the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Linking of the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is inevitable.

[Curic] What can be expected to happen in the next several weeks?

[Zubak] The military operations have accelerated the process. Nobody knows with certainty whether this peace initiative will end successfully. We support the peace initiative, and the attitude of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that one should look for a political settlement, and that the war and killing must stop. Those who represent the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not only there, will have to make great effort to understand what their realistic capacities are, and that their interests cannot be accomplished at the expense of other peoples' interests.

Minister Soljic Views Military 'Successes'

AU2609092695 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 95 p 7

[Interview with Vladimir Soljic, "Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia defense minister," by Miljenko Karacic; place and date not given: "We Proved Our Power in the 'Maestral' Action"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another brilliant action by Croatian military forces, "Maestral Two," is behind us. Mr. Vladimir Soljic, the defense minister and the vice chairman of the government of "the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia," is the best person to inform us about the action, its results, and importance. It is therefore understandable that this conversation began with a question about "Maestral Two," and its political importance.

[Soljic] By our latest military action, we have achieved political results that our leadership wanted. One should not forget that the main initiator of everything is the political leadership of the Croatian people, and it is well known that it is led by President Franjo Tudjman. The leadership of "the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia" is independent to the extent that is necessary and it does not feel inferior, because it really does represent the Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Global decisions are, naturally, taken in line with general interests at the Croatian center, in Zagreb.

[Karacic] What are the military results of the action carried out between Drvar and Vrbas?

[Soljic] The results of "Maestral Two" are really wonderful. We have liberated more than 2,000 square kilometers of territory and taken very important heights such as Demirovac, Bitorog, Mlinista, and others. In many places we have reached the natural border, either a river or a high mountain, or the ethnic border.

The HVO [Croatian Defense Council] Controls 22-25 Percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina

[Karacic] How much of Bosnia-Herzegovina is now controlled by Croatian forces?

[Soljic] The defense line toward the Serbian aggressor have not been completely established. There are still many places where broken Serbian units remained deep in our territory. Therefore it can be said that the HVO controls between 22 and 25 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the defense lines have been stabilized, we shall have a far more precise indicator.

[Karacic] In the liberation of the territory of the future Croatian-Muslim Federation, the HVO and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were supported strongly by the Croatian Army. Will the Croatian Army remain on the territories it liberated?

[Soljic] The Croatian Army came to the territories you mentioned on the invitation of both the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which complies with the declaration signed in Split. The Croatian Army successfully completed the action together with the HVO and it can, if this is required, leave these territories, with no risk that these territories might be lost. If there should be real danger from the Serbian aggressor, I am convinced that it will not withdraw. As long as the situation is unstable, it is in the interests of both the Croatian and the Muslim peoples that the Croatian Army stays where it is.

[Karacic] Owing to the actions performed by the Croatian Army and the HVO, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has also achieved good results in the liberation of occupied territories. How much of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is now controlled by the Croatian and Muslim military forces?

[Soljic] The UN Protection Force published data in Sarajevo according to which the Serbian army controls 49.7 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the HVO 20.4 percent, and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina 29.9 percent. I cannot be as precise, for the reasons I have already mentioned and because there will be further adjustments, but, in any case, these forces control 50 percent of the territory.

A Solution to Banja Luka Should Be Reached in a Peaceful Way

[Karacic] Is there a possibility that Serbia will get involved in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what would happen then?

[Soljic] Serbia, either as a "small Serbia" or a "greater Serbia," has caused numerous conflicts, even major wars. This possibility should not be forgotten. This time, however, the world knows that such a thing is possible, and it will certainly bear this in mind. The Croatian Army, the HVO, and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are able to oppose the Serbian forces, since they were able to oppose them even when the balance of forces was far more favorable for the Serbs than now.

[Karacic] Three possibilities are mentioned for Banja Luka: its military liberation, its peaceful reintegration into the political system of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its exchange for other territories. What will happen with this town?

[Soljic] All these options are both speculation and real possibilities at the same time. If Banja Luka is liberated, this would mean the complete defeat of the Serbian aggressor, which powerful international factors do not allow. I would personally be pleased if Banja Luka entered the Federation in a peaceful way.

[Karacic] Are the latest successes of the Croatian forces a result of their superiority on the front, or are they a consequence of Serbian weakness?

[Soljic] The successes are not a coincidence, they are a result of good political preparations, or to be more precise, of the precise definition of goals, and a considerable improvement in the defense system. The Serbian aggressor has not become weak, but the Croatian forces have developed, so that they can completely break any enemy.

The World Respects Force

[Karacic] What do the latest military actions, especially those in Bosnia, mean for the peace negotiations mediated by the international community?

[Soljic] The world still primarily respects force and power. If the balance of power on the front had not changed to the advantage of the Croatian-Muslim forces, there would not have been this kind of peace negotiations. The world would have simply acknowledged the reality after some time. In other words, the latest military actions were actions for peace, although they were military actions.

[Karacic] Although there were reports from the front that the Croatian forces cooperated with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian media were full of allegations that there were new conflicts between Croats and Muslims in western Bosnia. Are these conflicts completely fabricated?

[Soljic] The Croatian and Muslim leaderships learned enough from their conflict. Such a conflict can only be useful for the Serbs. There will certainly be no such conflict again. There are people who try to turn even the smallest incident—which is possible in every army, especially at the points where two armies meet on the front—into a major war. After the truce was reached between the Croatian and the Muslim sides, there have been no new conflicts, and I am more than convinced that they will never come into conflict again.

[Karacic] Can you, as an experienced economist, assess what the newly liberated areas mean for the development of Herzeg-Bosnia, and how realistic is it to expect that normal life could return there soon?

[Soljic] By the liberation of new territories, the Croatian body on the whole, and Herzeg-Bosnia especially, will take on a shape that we shall be able to defend. This will be a territory that we will be able to cover with communications and energy supply systems. It will be a territory that is an adjunct to the Republic of Croatia. There is the same number of housing facilities in Herzeg-Bosnia now as there were before the war, the only difference is that they are not situated in the same territory, so that there is no longera need for the Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina to live as refugees.

Blows Against the Basis of the HVO

[Karacic] How do you comment on the bitterness that could be heard in some circles after the recent successes?

[Soljic] Since I have been in my current post, the territory of Herzeg-Bosnia has doubled in size. Everything has gone according to the plan. The payments for the disabled soldiers and their families have increased. My policy follows the idea of Maks Luburic, which was elaborated by the great political genius of the Croatian emigration, Mr. Bruno Busic, according to which there can be no success for the Croats as long as the sons of Croatian ustashas are not united with partisans. The HVO can set an example in that respect, since its command structure consists of Croatian emigrants, legion members, former Yugoslav People's Army officers, and people who became officers during the latest war. There is no difference between them. It is not a coincidence that there are blows against the basis of the HVO right now. This is done by people who are not ready for the present time and present tasks, or by foreign intelligence services, primarily the counterintelligence services.

[Karacic] How can we thank the soldiers who participated in the latest Patriotic War for everything they have done?

[Soljic] We cannot care enough for the soldiers. We have to care for the families of those who lost their lives for Croatia, we have to care for the disabled, I primarily mean governmental organizations, but also neighbors, friends.... We have developed a system of social care, and every disabled soldier receives a monthly payment we can afford. In cooperation with the Republic of Croatia, we shall try to equalize all former soldiers, since they all fought for Croatia, from Vukovar to Jajce.

[Box, p 7]

There Will Be No Trade With Posavina

[Soljic] Croatian territories, including Posavina, will not be sold, exchanged, or traded in any other sense. Croatian soil is not for sale; this must be clear to everyone. It is impossible, however, for all Croats to live in one state, except if the whole planet is one state. Many of them could live in one state if they created a new Yugoslavia. The first scenario is unrealistic, the latter is unacceptable to every Croat.

Posavina is a rich region, and we shall do everything we can to liberate it, militarily if necessary. It hurts me that the greatest fighters for Posavina are considered to have done nothing for it. I think the greatest fighters for Posavina are those who succeeded in retaining the part of it necessary for its enlargement. It should be enlarged to a size that will correspond to the complete Croatian territory.

Refugee Return, Resettlement Issues Discussed

Return to 'Liberated Areas'

LD2509224495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At its session today, presided over by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina discussed the return of refugees to newly liberated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

While considering the issue of refugees, the Government also discussed a recent Croatian Government decision, which takes effect this evening, according to which those who come from the areas of Bihac, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Petrovac, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Donji Vakuf, Kljuc, and some other towns in the federation lose their refugee status. This decision does not apply to those who come from the areas of Stolac, Capljina, Mostar, Kiseljak, and Zepce. In light of the fact that the Government of the Republic and the Federation has not been officially informed about this decision, it was concluded that, if such a decision really exists, its postponement will be demanded until an agreement on this issue is reached. [passage omitted]

Serb Resettlement in Derventa

LD2409185895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1635 GMT 24 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj 24 Sep (SRNA)—Gvozden Ruzicic, the commissioner for refugees of the Derventa Municipality, said today that 2,300 Serb families from the [Bosanski Petrovac] area [recently captured by the Croatian Army] wanted to settle permanently in the Derventa area [on the corridor linking Banja Luka with Serbia proper].

"Accommodation has already been provided for about 50 percent of the families, and it will soon be found for the rest," Ruzicic said.

Krajisnik: Serbs Satisfied With Compromise

LD2509215595 Pale Srpksa Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] What platform is the Serb Republic taking to negotiations in New York tomorrow? This was a question that we have put to Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Serb Republic People's Assembly.

[Begin Krajisnik recording] Political negotiations and political activities in connection with the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis are continuing. We have had a number of consultations with international mediators, with the Americans, with cochairman Bildt. We have coordinated certain views with regard to the upcoming meeting that is to take place in New York.

A delegation of Yugoslavia, which includes our two representatives—Vice President Koljevic and Foreign Minister Buha—will advocate a position that we coordinated in our joint delegation. The important thing that has stemmed from those consultations, and which will be the subject of our talks, is that we should build on the constitutional principles that have already been agreed upon at the Geneva meeting.

We are now trying to work on certain groups of problems and some segments of the setup [of the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina]. What deserves special attention is what affairs will be within the jurisdiction of that union of Bosnia-Herzegovina and what affairs will remain within the jurisdiction of the republics—the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation.

We demanded that we should abide by the framework agreement and that there can be no surprises. What remains within the jurisdiction of the union is only a segment of the foreign policy and UN membership. Certain affairs will be discharged at the level of the Serb Republic, and certain affairs will be discharged at the level of the union, according to our interest. I believe that this compromise solution satisfies the interests of the Serb people.

We have some criticism, nevertheless, we have agreed in principle to this compromise, to accept a union as a kind of compromise leading to a sound territorial demarcation. However, we maintain that only negotiations can lead to a solution. There must be certain compromises in negotiations.

The delegation has left for New York. We can now see that the Muslims and Croats are now dissatisfied, they have certain critical remarks and problems. The Muslim-Croatian offensive is continuing, something that renders the situation even more complex and leads to a new turning point, that is the war may continue and this peace process may, so to speak, disappear. Nevertheless, we believe that the peace process will continue for two reasons.

First, the desires and the unrealistic approach and ambitions of the Muslims and Croats are on a megalomaniac's scale.

Second, the United States, which protected the Muslims and Croats in the past, being one of the main factors in undermining all the agreements, has now firmly committed itself to leading this process to an end.

It will be a major political handicap for President Clinton and his political struggle if he were not successful in his intention, i.e. to bring about an agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Why am I saying that there is optimism? He made a Washington Agreement, he forced an ox to kiss a horse, these are two enemies, and to live in a Muslim-Croat Federation where interests are totally opposed.

True, this federation is also based on hatred of Serbs. Nevertheless, they have forced these two nations to live together. They will also force all of them to accept the peace solution the Americans want. Their most serious problem is to secure this with the Serbs. We have demonstrated our maximum cooperation in our efforts to find a solution, but only up to the point we agreed on. We are certainly going to reject any surprises. I believe that things should progress at their own pace. We are concerned over the offensives although we have already consolidated our ranks. Our army is firmly holding its positions. It has even improved its positions on some front lines.

I believe that in the wake of this consolidation there will be no major successes, i.e. our enemy will have no success. This was the main reason behind their faked optimism as they believed that they could secure a solution by military means. Nevertheless, we should hope for a better solution, particularly if there is no war in Sarajevo, because Sarajevo is one of the main keys, or more precisely the main key to the crisis. If a war breaks out in Sarajevo I do not believe there will be any negotiations. I do not believe either that we will be able, excluding military means, to have a political solution, a solution in general to the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis. [end recording]

Ninkovic Declares Serbs Taking 'Initiative'

LD2509123695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1108 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 25 Sep (TANJUG)—Miljan Ninkovic, defense minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said today that the battlefront in the western part of the Serb Republic had been stabilized and that the Serb fighters had taken initiative.

"We stopped the attacks on the rivers Sava and Una and inflicted huge losses in manpower and equipment on the Croats. I think that the Croats have abandoned the offensive, and that the so-called Croat-Muslim federation would soon do the same," Ninkovic told Radio Doboj.

According to him, the Ozren battlefield, the other big hotspot in the Serb Republic, has also been stabilized.

Asked whether Ozren and Doboj will belong to the Serbs, Ninkovic said yes.

Tudjman: Croatia Will Not Make Any Compromises

BR2509155895 Paris LE FIGARO in French 25 Sep 95 p 2

[Interview With Croatian President Franjo Tudjman by Patrick de Saint-Exupery in Zagreb; date not given: "Franjo Tudjman: We Will Not Make Any Compromises"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [de Saint-Exupery] Mr. President, in Paris, London, Washington, Sarajevo, and Belgrade, everyone seems to be talking about nothing but peace. What do you think?

[Tudjman] I have to believe in peace. If I had no faith in peace, then my political activity would make no sense. Wars must come to an end.

[de Saint-Exupery] And today you believe that the war is near its end?

[Tudjman] Yes.

[de Saint-Exupery] Why?

[Tudjman] Because the Serbs are in a dead-end situation. They started this war, but their policy has now run its course. They stand defeated, and their plans have failed. They have no other choice but to try and hang on to their territorial gains in Bosnia.

[de Saint-Exupery] To reach a peaceful solution, the warring factions will have to come to some agreement. Is Croatia ready to make any concessions, as the Serbs will have to do?

[Tudjman] Croatia is not inclined to make the slightest compromise. We cannot, nor will we have to, accept this. We have liberated the lion's share of the territory captured by the Serbs. Just 4.5 percent of our territory remains occupied. We will have to liberate it.

We intend to do this in a peaceful manner. Should this prove impossible, we will have no other choice but to use the methods that have already enabled us to liberate the rest of our territory.

Having said that, Croatia wants to normalize its relations with Serbia, by which I mean the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia (Serbia plus Montenegro—LE FIGARO editor's note) invented by the Serbs, as soon as possible. This normalization of relations is essential and it could be achieved on the basis of a mutual recognition of our borders. Allow me to conjure up this image: To establish a durable new order in southeastern Europe, the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia is as important as the rapprochement between France and Germany was for the construction of Europe.

[de Saint-Exupery] When you say that 4.5 percent of Croatian territory is still occupied by the Serbs, you are talking of eastern Slavonia. Is it conceivable that the Serbs will agree to give back Slavonia?

[Tudjman] First of all, you should know that the Croats have always had the relative majority in eastern Slavonia. Before the war they represented 45 percent of the population, whereas the Serbs only comprised 34 percent of the population. So it is impossible to envision the slightest compromise. Where Slavonia is concerned there will be no concessions.

On the other hand, today the balance of forces is in our favor. In our opinion the Croatian Army is capable of liberating eastern Slavonia in the same way as Knin was liberated. The Serbs will no doubt put up considerable resistance, but there is no way in which they will be able to hold us back. There are two main reasons for this: Firstly, the Serbian population is well aware of the fact that it cannot expect any aid from Serbia; secondly, because of its international isolation and catastrophic economic situation, Serbia has nothing to gain by starting a general war against Croatia.

Finally, public opinion in Serbia is becoming increasingly aware that it is essential that the relations between our two countries become normalized.

[de Saint-Exupery] You seem very sure of yourself when minimizing the risk of intervention by the former Federal Army in Slavonia. Why is this?

[Tudjman] I am not ruling out this possibility. All the more so since the former people's army already has troops on the ground there. It will probably try and do something, but I believe that it will prove possible to reintegrate this territory peaceably, with a military operation only being something to envision as a last resort.

Today everyone recognizes that eastern Slavonia is part of Croatia. Even the Russians, who are allies of the Serbs, concede this. Intervention by Serbia would only cause the situation to deteriorate. On the other hand, if Serbia gives up eastern Slavonia, then it would only derive advantages from doing so. We could normalize our relations and thereby reestablish links with Europe and the world, reopen the roads, railways, and so on.

I am 70-percent certain that we have created the conditions that will enable us to reach a peaceful solution. In any case, we will be able to resolve this problem rather quickly in the event of our meeting any resistance.

[de Saint-Exupery] In mid-July you said that Slavonia would be liberated within three months. Does that still apply?

[Tudjman] No Croat will ever forget eastern Slavonia. So I hope we will be able to resolve this problem with the help of the peace initiatives mounted by the United States, the EU, and Russia, or even via direct negotiations with the Serbs in the region in question and with Belgrade.

[de Saint-Exupery] Is there a deadline, a set final date?

[Tudjman] A deadline has been set, namely the expiry of the UN mandate. There will be no extensions of this deadline.

[de Saint-Exupery] Do you believe that the problems of Slavonia and Bosnia should be linked together?

[Tudjman] There is no formal link. In reality, both cases have arisen as a result of Serbian aggression.

[de Saint-Exupery] So these two problems are linked. They should not be dealt with separately during the negotiations.

[Tudjman] Yes. And above all because of the sanctions.

[de Saint-Exupery] Back in March 1991 you said: "The solution resides in dividing Bosnia along ethnic lines which would enable the Serbs and Croats to link up with their neighboring republics. Meanwhile the Muslims could be given a ministate in central Bosnia." Does this statement still apply today?

[Tudjman] I do not believe that I said precisely that.

[de Saint-Exupery] Yes, you did.

[Tudjman] The crisis in Bosnia is really the result of extremely complex relations. We have three national entities there, three different civilizations. Under Tito the communists sought to facilitate the existence of Bosnia, but they ended up merely complicating the situation by making the Muslims a nationality.

During the negotiations held back in 1990, and above all at the start of Serbian aggression in 1991, we reached a point at which we envisaged resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina by creating a union of three republics: one Muslim, one Serbian, and one Croatian. The Serbian and Croatian republics would then have had the opportunity to link up with Serbia and Croatia respectively. That solution would have been acceptable from the Croatian point of view. On the other hand, it was not acceptable for Europe and the West.

Europe and the West did not want to see a Muslim state in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however small in size. They did not want to give the Serbs a chance to support fundamentalist Muslim activities in Europe. Consequently, thanks to the efforts made by the West, the establishment of a Croatian-Muslim Federation was proposed. For strategic reasons, primarily the border problem, Croatia consented to this.

In so doing, we took on the task with which Europe had entrusted us, namely the Europeanization of the Bosnian Muslims. We are the guarantors of their integration into European civilization, and of the fact that they will not become fundamentalists in the future. Moreover, historically speaking most Bosnian Muslims have Croatian origins. Many of them speak "Ikavski" (the Croatian literary language—LE FIGARO editor's note).

Whatever the case may be, there will always be problems to do with civilization even within the Federation, as there will also be between the Federation and Croatia. Croatia will only be able to meet this challenge with Europe's and the West's help.

[de Saint-Exupery] So according to you the Geneva agreement reached on 8 September constitutes the definitive settlement of the Bosnian crisis?

[Tudjman] The biggest problem is the one associated with territorial delimitations. Under the terms of the peace plan signed in Geneva, Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain a member of the United Nations. However, the fact that the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Croatian-Muslim Federation might link up with Serbia and Croatia respectively proves that the issue at question not only concerns how to delimit the sphere of influence between the Serbs and Croats or between the Muslims and the Serbs, but how to place some boundary markers between Eastern and Western Europe.

This delimitation began with the disintegration of the Roman Empire and has continued until today. On the one hand we have an area under Russian Orthodox influence, while on the other we have an area of Western European influence.

[de Saint-Exupery] Are you alluding to the map carving Bosnia up into two parts that you are alleged to have drawn at a gala dinner held in London?

[Tudjman] During a conversation I was having I simply reproduced a map that had been drawn by a French publisher in Brussels. This map, which effectively delimited the spheres of influence that I am talking about, did not merely concern Bosnia. It extended as far as northern Russia and was published, so I am told, at the instigation of Western strategists.

[de Saint-Exupery] But is this map which, where Bosnia is concerned, is identical to the drawing you supposedly made in London, in line with your ideas?

[Tudjman] The map expresses a historical reality.

[de Saint-Exupery] Is Herzeg Bosna, the republic created by the Bosnian Croats, a burden for Croatia, or do you believe that its leaders are justified in calling for what they want, namely the possibility of a linkup with Croatia again?

[Tudjman] For geopolitical and strategic reasons, Croatia has an interest in linking up with Bosnia-Herzegovina again. All the same, within the Croatian-Muslim Federation the Muslims' numerical superiority over the Croats will give rise to a problem to do with civilization. Despite this, we all have something to gain by bringing about this federation. For the Muslims it represents practically the only way for them to survive on this territory, provided of course that they agree to become Europeans and not fundamentalists.

[de Saint-Exupery] Are there people in the Bosnian Government in Sarajevo whom you consider to be Muslim extremists?

[Tudjman] Generally speaking, I can say that there are no fundamentalists in the Muslim Government. However, when they speak of a civil state they are all thinking of a state based on a Muslim majority, in other words a state that would have to respect the laws laid down in the Koran.

There are pragmatists among the leaders in Sarajevo. These people, like Messrs. Izetbegovic, Ganic, Sacirbegovic, and others, accept the Washington agreements. However, there are also people who brought mujahidin into Bosnia. There are no such people in the highest echelons of power, but they do exist all the same.

[de Saint-Exupery] The Croatian Parliament has just been dissolved at the initiative of your party. Is this not a certain way of asking for a blank check to negotiate peace?

[Tudjman] The parliament was dissolved because the situation has changed. One quarter of our country has just been liberated. Furthermore, Croatian democracy is still defining itself: 24 deputies out of 120 have switched parties since the 1992 elections. Finally, we have a large number of small parties that do not represent much at all, whereas we would like Croatian democracy to become more credible. The circumstances now are much more favorable to tackle the problems with which we are confronted head on.

[de Saint-Exupery] So it is by no means a case of asking for a blank check to lead the negotiations?

[Tudjman] On this point there is total agreement among Croatian public opinion. There are certainly differences regarding the assessment of the problem of Bosnia, but not regarding Croatia. Our country is enjoying a full-blown national renaissance. Thanks to the strength of our democratic order, all the extremist parties on both the left and right have been sidelined. They have much less influence here than in other countries which, after all, have a longer democratic tradition.

[de Saint-Exupery] When it arrived in Croatia in July, the Rapid Reaction Force [RRF] had great difficulties moving around within your country. Why was that?

[Tudjman] It is quite simple: We did not know what the RRF had come to do. Remember, we are a sovereign country, and the forces that are present here must take this into account. What is more, we were preparing to liberate Knin. We had to be certain that the RRF was not coming to impose some kind of a solution in Croatia.

[de Saint-Exupery] Does the RRF now enjoy your full support?

[Tudjman] Yes.

[de Saint-Exupery] Did you appreciate the fact that, when he took office, Jacques Chirac shifted policy regarding the Yugoslav dossier?

[Tudjman] Yes. And I would like to say that Croatia intends to develop good relations with France. Although there are some biased Frenchmen, France is an attractive cultural center for Croatia. I feel immensely satisfied at being able to say that recently the relations between France and Croatia have improved at all levels.

President Tudjman Satisfied With Visit to France

LD2509235395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Republic Franjo Tudjman and Croatia's state delegation have just returned to Zagreb from France. Drazen Korda reporting from Zagreb airport:

As he was getting out of the aircraft, President Tudjman made the following statement in reply to a question on relations between Croatia and France:

[Begin Tudjman recording] A great deal of progress has been made. Our relations were good even up to that point but this visit created conditions for the true development of friendly relations between Croatia and France in every sphere. President Chirac said that Croatia could count on France as a friend and I also said, of course, that France could be certain that Croatia is her friend. We agreed that the signing of this agreement should be just the first step in developing more comprehensive economic relations and wide-ranging cooperation in other areas. I am very satisfied, this is one of the more successful state visits. [end recording]

Commentary on Increased U.S. Diplomatic Efforts

AU2609095095 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 19 Sep 95 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "No Favorites—From Ljubljana to Athens"]

[FBIS Translated Text] However much discussion there may be about final justice or injustice, determination or cowardice, ignorance or superiority, unforgivable tardiness or finally good timing—all of which can be heard in the current discussions of the still secretive U.S. peace plan—everyone in this area would like to sit in the powerful American lap in the role of the best liked and most important regional favorite. Drnovsek did not hesitate to admit that the two-day official visit of the U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry was one of the most important events in the diplomatic history of independent Slovenia. On the occasion of presenting anniversary state awards, Tudjman bragged that someone from the U.S. delegation headed by the tireless Richard Holbrooke, which visited the Presidential Palace that same day, had openly confessed to him that "the U.S. initiative was possible only once Croatia became internally strong and once it stabilized its internal organization."

Sali Berisha, president of Albania, also visited Washington recently in order to improve his preelection reputation and consolidate the U.S.-Albanian military and economic cooperation (Albania is a member of Partnership for Peace, which provides Americans with very important military services). Skopje, after four years, finally felt relief and gratitude about the fact that Cyrus Vance and U.S. diplomacy, with Bill Clinton's presence and supervision, finally managed to bring Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Greece to the same table and thus almost completely cool off one of the most unpleasant Balkan conflicts. The tireless Richard Holbrooke visited Zagreb, Belgrade, and Sarajevo seven times in only three weeks, and Americans have thus in the past two weeks or so displayed unprecedented diplomatic liveliness from Maribor to Salonika, visiting or hosting practically everbody who once constituted Yugoslavia or found themselves involved in the confusion of its Balkan loves and hates: that of Slovenia and Croatia, Croatia and Bosnia, Serbia and Albania, Macedonia and Greece....

There is no doubt that the Croatian president would also very much like to hear some of the great praises that Perry gave the democratic and market-oriented Slovenia, since Tudjman, without the support of any proof, personally enjoys putting Croatia into first place all the time—whether the issue is "democratic stability," "economic wonder," "expulsion of communism," "regional importance," or "military power." Perry tackled the latter by giving military praises, but also raising great subquestions about Croatian statesmen's political wisdom. In the interview to DELO, Perry openly established that within only one year the Croatian Army became so well trained and professional that it could easily "defeat the Bosnian Serbs, too." However, this could lead to an escalation of the conflict, which could directly involve Serbia in the war in which Serbia would tie itself to Russia, and Croatia to the United States. "This scenario seems like a nightmare to me, and we must do everything for it not to come true," said Perry.

That same evening deputy prime minister of Croatia Bosiljko Misetic openly announced that Croats and Bosniaks would like to liberate the whole of western Bosnia, including Banja Luka, regardless of many estimates coming from abroad saying that such a military enterprise would directly involve Belgrade in the war and make any general peace agreement impossible. This is blowing air into Karadzic's flute, and such announcements, along with Silajdzic and Sacirbegovic's statements saying that "military victory on the ground is the best diplomacy," could be one of the main reasons Holbrooke openly stated that it was he personally who convened the meeting of Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Zubak in Zagreb. One of the topics of discussion at this meeting under open U.S. supervision will probably be everything that causes the Americans, too, to have the worst nightmares that Perry so openly talked about in the immediate neighborhood of Zagreb.

Mate Granic swears that he has not seen "any new U.S. geographical maps," but that does not mean that they do not exist—at least in principle—in the form of the assumption that some previous agreements will be observed. Washington has recently proven in many ways that it has decided to mortgage its global reputation in this part of the world, regardless of the arguments with Moscow and misunderstandings with the European allies. Even a superficial analysis will show that most of these U.S. diplomatic and military efforts wish at least to set a limit to the crimes and damage Belgrade has already done or may do, and Washington has the right to expect of its real or self-proclaimed allies and favorites not to jeopardize—in their short-term blindness—everything that Clinton has been trying to fix, darn, and bring to life, from Ljubljana to Athens. In this attempt of a final cleaning up there is not and there will not be any free love.

HSP Spokesman Djapic Views Coming Election

AU2509124195 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 95 p 5

[Interview with HSP spokesman Anto Djapic by Andrea Latinovic; place and date not given: "We Will Become Strongest Oppositional Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is there anything new on the right of the Croatian political arena? Do tremors and party transfers happen there, too, or has the "danger" been avoided? How should one go to the elections, how can one prepare oneself? These and other questions have been answered by Croatian Party of Rights [HSP] spokesman and top candidate on its electoral list, Anto Djapic.

[Latinovic] Is the decision that HSP should go to the elections independently still valid?

[Djapic] That is the party headquarters decision from July of this year, when we made the decision that the HSP would go to the elections independently for the state list. The decision is still valid. Regarding the majority units, certain election coalitions are not impossible.

[Latinovic] What are your chances? Be realistic, what percentage of votes do you expect?

[Djapic] We have not given special thought to percentage, because we have big ambitions on these elections. Our ambition is to become the strongest oppositional party.

[Latinovic] Do you think you can overtake the liberals, who are now in that position?

[Djapic] I am sure of it!

We Are Going To Overrun Liberals!

[Latinovic] Why do you think you could be the first oppositional party? Where did you get such self-confidence? Do you think you can beat the liberals because they are now occupied with their internal problems? And what is offered by the HSP that is not offered by HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party]?

[Djapic] I do not think we will beat the liberals only because of their problems. The HSP should just present, in an effective way, who has been saying and doing what over these last five years, and on the basis of our program we will be offered space for action. The central HSP idea will be concern for the Croatians and the struggle for an honest Croatia. It is because we are not a party burdened with irregularities in ownership transformation, we have no former party secretaries, UDBA [State Security] members, we have thousands of Homeland Liberation War volunteers and support within the Croatian Army and the support of all those people in Croatia who in every possible way experienced the hardships of war. If we add a great number of traditionally rightist families to that, then it is a very respectable electoral body, which gives us the right to be optimistic regarding the election results.

You asked me what we offered, and what the liberals offered. I will tell you: We offer stability in the party, a recognizable program, because we are not short runners and we do not show impatience, as the majority of the oppositional parties does. We work positively and we do not offer merely attacks on the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and President Tudjman. Our main objective is not to overthrow the HDZ, our objective is to fight for a position and to be constructive. But that does not mean that we favor the HDZ—remember how passionately we criticized certain of their moves.

[Latinovic] Why do you not want to enter a coalition with other parties? You are relying very much on your own strength aren't you?

[Djapic] We are not joining forces because of big differences in our programs and belief in our own strength. However, in majority cases we may support certain candidates if they fulfill our criteria, no matter whether they come from the HDZ or from the opposition. The closest solution is that we will nevertheless be independent in all units. It is because we do not want to be a "towing service" for the parties that have little chance of being elected to the parliament.

Who Should "Disappear"?

[Latinovic] Which parties do you have in mind?

[Djapic] Those of extreme leftist and regionalist type. Not, of course, real regional parties, but the independent type of parties. Everybody knows who we mean—the parties that should disappear from the political arena or should at least be pushed as far as possible to the margins.

[Latinovic] What are your objections to the opposition? You very often deviate from the stands of the united opposition.

[Djapic] The opposition was wasting time trying to respond to a movement, the HDZ, with another movement, using less important things as a reason for it. Without a program, it has had no chance of success. The HSP has tried to create a recognizable image and we have succeeded. We cannot condemn every move made by the HDZ only because it was made by the HDZ. Nor can we constantly condemn moves by the

Croatian authorities simply because it is the authority. A typical example of this is the opposition's wrong assumption at the moment of the parliament crisis, when we showed maximum maturity and seriousness. Why should we have the same stand in everything as the liberals or some left-wing party? We have our program and we follow it.

[Latinovic] From everything you have said, one can see that you personally already think that the HSP is now a superior oppositional party. However, what do you offer the Croatian people, that is not offered by HDZ?

[Djapic] We have strong political arguments against the HDZ as well. The basic argument is that it has not crossed the minds of the HDZ leaders to work upon their own party, but they prefer to remain a movement. Therefore they gather people helter-skelter, thinking that they will get a wider electorate, unlike us, who were the first in the opposition to realize what it means to work upon a party. To gather people from other parties in that way is a double-edged sword, and it can turn about like a boomerang. On the other hand, the HDZ is burdened with the mortgage of misses in privatization, personnel policy, with inherited administrative apparatus, and we in the HSP know very well how to make use of it.

It Is Closer to Us Than We Are to It

[Latinovic] It turns out that the HSP in its own convictions is closer to the HDZ than to the opposition.

[Djapic] No, I would say that the party in power is closer to us than we are to it. It has started to implement the policy that we have always advocated, which is a sign that the HDZ is coming to its senses. Croatian policy is turning toward the right-wing idea.

[Latinovic] You have recently announced the gathering of some right-wing parties around the HSP on the eve of the elections. At what stage is this now?

[Djapic] We are very satisfied with what we are doing—the union with the HCSP [Croatian Pure Party of Rights] and our common appearance with the Croatian Republican Community within the HSP on the elections. At this moment we have practically encircled the whole body of the Party of Rights. We do not want to lose any Party of Rights vote. The HSP is, perhaps, the staff party of the Croatian right.

[Latinovic] Why was the HSP not caught in the "storm" of transfers?

[Djapic] It is because people believe in the program and in the good result on the next elections. Any coup within the party or anyone leaving the party at this moment, after the elections have been announced, would mean in the eyes of the Croatian public that their rating would rapidly fall. It is already too late for any party to try such actions now.

[Latinovic] Is there any news about the status of Ante Prkacin, who has still not denied announcements of his leaving the HSP?

[Djapic] It is exclusively up to him to decide to stay or to leave the party. We should leave it to him to make a decision.

Paraga Is Far Removed From Party of Right Policy

[Latinovic] Do you follow your former party colleague Dobroslav Paraga's work and the work of his party HSP-1861?

[Djapic] Not at all. I can only see that one part of the opposition has put him to coordinate with them in the supervision of the elections. I hope they cooperate well with him and his party, which means that I do not have to worry about my own election result.

[Latinovic] Finally, tell me, do you think that perhaps it could nevertheless come to a kind of cooperation between the HSP and HSP-1861, because one can never know in politics...

[Djapic] That is correct, there is nothing 100 percent sure in politics. But, Paraga! What has he got to do with the idea of the Party of Rights? He is far removed from it.

[Box, p 5]

Banja Luka and the End of the "Greater Serbian" Dream

[Latinovic] Do you believe that Bosnia-Herzegovina is going to be preserved as an integral state?

[Djapic] Of course. I believe that there is a kind of agreement between Tudjman and Izetbegovic. That agreement is being made reality on the ground, and it is obvious it is going toward Banja Luka. That would finally mean the end of the dream of Greater Serbia. That story will reach an end with the liberation of Banja Luka.

[Latinovic] How can the question of Banja Luka be solved? It is said that there are approximately 100,000 Serb refugees, and on the approaching roads alone there are some 40,000. What about those Serb civilians?

[Djapic] We did not start this war. Croatian and Bosniak people have been passing through Calvary and still pass through it now. Although personally one can feel compassion for any human tragedy, the Serbs must finally ask themselves why their leaders have taken them on the road of new "migrations." The joined sides of

Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina must respect only the international war conventions, and let those who have pushed the Serb minority into all this worry about its position in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is no longer our problem.

HNDL 'To Link Its Future Activity' to HDZ

AU2509114095 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 95 p 4

[Unattributed report: "HNDL Joins HDZ"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—The process of unification of the parties of the Croatian statehood circle has concluded for the Croatian National Democratic League [HNDL]. Having summed up the entire activity of augmentation [ukrupnjavanje], which was the party's strategic target, the HNDL Supreme Council has decided to link its future activity to the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], an HNDL announcement says.

The HNDL has decided in favor of such an arrangement after almost one year of negotiations with the parties of the Croatian statehood circle. The HNDL has found the HDZ program to be complementary to its own, and joining it represents a guarantee for the party to be able to realize its basic program goals: complete freedom in Croatia within its internationally recognized borders and a democratic and rich Croatian state based on the rule of law. The HDZ program realizes the comprehensive national and statehood progress and welfare, which is fully guaranteed by the confident leadership of the HDZ headed by President Tudjman, the announcement says.

The HNDL emphasizes that it had not noticed the said elements with the parties it had contacted previously regarding unification, the Croatian Party of Rights and the Croatian Peasant Party. By signing up to join the HDZ, the HNDL's legal subjectivity will cease in two or three days.

Human Rights Law To Be Modified Until Census

AU2209103195 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Nada Dmitrovic and Andrea Latinovic: "Already Tough About the Agenda"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb—The first fall session of the Chamber of Counties started on Friday with the Croatian anthem, a statement of gratitude to all the participants in the Storm military operation, and with a minute of silence in memory of all the fallen defenders. However, the solemn tone was disturbed immediately thereafter with a strenuous, two-hour debate that was interrupted several times to allow the Club of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] to meet, as well as a joint meeting of the clubs of the opposition parties.

The new chairman of the Club of the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS], Mladen Godek, claimed on behalf of his party that this 27th session had not been called in accordance with the new statute, that is, that new working bodies had not been constituted, nor had the new deputy chairman of the Chamber of Counties been designated from the opposition, which has remained without a deputy chairman after Damir Zoric's transfer to the HDZ.

As even after two and a half hours there were no signs that any accord was possible to achieve, the chairwoman of the Chamber, Katica Ivanisevic, interrupted the debate and announced that she would skip the first item on the agenda, that is, the constitution of working bodies with the Croatian parliament's Chamber of Counties. She said that the issue would be reintroduced on the agenda at subsequent meetings. [passage omitted]

Busy Misetic

The introduction to the second item on the agenda—the bill on temporary nonimplementation of certain clauses of the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, with the final bill of the law—was made by Deputy Prime Minister Bosiljko Misetic. He pointed out that around 300,000 Serbs had left Croatia, while some 280,000 Serbs had remained. The government therefore proposed to the Assembly to modify the constitutional law and to leave the amendment in force until exact data on the structure of the population is obtained by means of a census. "With the implementation of this law," Misetic said, "Croatia is promoting human rights." He announced that the new census is supposed to take place in the course of the next year, and on several occasions he repeated that the new constitutional law strictly observes human rights.

Krunoslav Oreskovic of HSLS was interested in whether the adoption of the new law contradicted international regulations. Misetic answered that everything was done in accordance with similar laws in the world. After a brief debate, with the majority of votes for it and two abstentions, the Chamber of Counties endorsed the this constitutional law bill.

Deputy Prime Minister Misetic explained the Bill on the 1996 Census. He pointed out that this is no preliminary census, but rather the first regular census in the new Croatian state. He underlined that in the new census Yugoslav as a nationality does not exist, and instead of Muslim the term Bosniak has been introduced. Stjepan

Babic (HDZ) proposed that on that occasion the victims of war and the postwar period should be listed from 1941 to the present now. After a brief debate the deputies endorsed the Bill on the 1996 Census.

Opposition Against Urgency

After that there followed a package of electoral laws proposed for urgent adoption, but liberal Mladen Godek said there was no need for urgency. His party colleague Zarko Katic asked why the electoral law envisaged 28 electoral units, and he also referred to the question of voting by the Croats of the diaspora. Krunoslav Oreskovic (HSLS) also asked why those laws should be urgently adopted, and why the vote of the diaspora Croats was more valuable than that of others. Damir Zoric (HDZ), replying to this, said there was absolutely nothing illogical about the electoral laws.

Zvonimir Goreta demanded that a deputy be designated from the Associations of Invalids of the Liberation War independently of the elections. He thinks, however, that national minorities should not have any particular status in the electoral law.

Milan Markanjevic (HSLS) reviewed the vote of the diaspora, saying that it does not help in any way. "It is a bad solution to let the diaspora have 12 deputies, because those people vote for laws in Croatia even though they do not live in it," Markanjevic said. He thinks that a different solution should be found to this question. Zdravko Tomac (Socialist Democratic Party) also demanded that the laws be adopted through a regular procedure, wondering why democratic principles should be violated by adopting such laws hastily. He pointed out that the electoral system is the continuation of electoral orchestration, and that such a system does not help strengthen the multiparty system, and it does precisely the opposite. Tomac thinks that the electoral system must not stir dissent between the HDZ on one side and the united left on the other side. On the contrary, it is supposed to help political parties give themselves profile.

Replying to Tomac, Hrvoje Sosic pointed out that the HDZ is the greatest Croatian political party. After a series of replies on the part of HDZ deputies Tomac repeated that the combination of several electoral systems does not necessarily have to produce a good electoral law.

Josip Manolic (HND) [Croatian Independent Democrats] proposed an amendment to Article 5, according to which ethnic Muslims, Slovenes and Albanians would each get a deputy elected in the Assembly.

Answering the questions, Deputy Prime Minister Misetic said that the proposer of the law had wanted to represent the electorate, and the law did not serve to promote parties. "The electorate," Misetic said, "has grown up from adolescence to adulthood, and political parties have also shaped up. The diaspora is not favored by the electoral law, and it is not even considered enough by it." He repeated that the restriction clause had been raised to 5 percent, and the view of the proposers of the law was that in Croatia there were only several clearly profiled parties. As for national minorities' rights, the proposer sticks to the Constitution. After a rather comprehensive and interesting debate the majority of votes expressed support for the bill.

Deportation of 100,000 Bosnian Refugees Seen

AU2509122095 Paris AFP in English
1148 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Sept 25 (AFP)—Croatia will deport Bosnian Croats and Moslems who took refuge here during the three-year war in northern Bosnia, government officials said here Monday.

The decision could affect half of the 200,000 refugees here, and likely reflects an effort on the part of the Croatian and Bosnian governments to repopulate formerly Serb-held land taken this month.

Many of the affected refugees come from land recently retaken by an offensive by Bosnian army and Croatian troops supporting Bosnian Croats, said Ana Markuz, a spokeswoman for the Croatian Office for Refugees.

Most of the refugees are from Jajce, Donji Vakuf, Grahovo and Bosanska Krupa, which were retaken in the past two months. Others fled towns such as Bihac, Travnik, Gornji Vakuf and Maglaj, which never fell to Bosnian Serbs but have been on or near the front lines for three years.

Croatia has complained about the expense of supporting an estimated 200,000 war refugees here. The refugees ministry could not give a figure for the number of probable returnees but it has been estimated at about 100,000.

The estimated 21,000 Croats and Moslems expelled from the northwestern Bosnian city of Banja Luka since early August are not affected by the decision, nor are refugees from territory still held by Bosnian Serbs, said Markuz. Banja Luka is the largest Serb-held town in Bosnia.

The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Zagreb said early Monday that it had been informed of the decision and was asking the Croatian government for clarification.

Davor Mayor: No More Bosnian Refugees

LD2109212695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnian Serbs are continuing ethnic cleansing in the areas still under their control in Bosnia. This afternoon, 159 Bosnian refugees from the areas of Banja Luka, Bosanska Gradiska, Derventa, and Prnjavor arrived in Davor [in Croatia]. Vladimir Fajgl has a report:

[Fajgl] This is yet more proof that the local Serbs, as well as those who have fled from Glamoc, Grahovo, Drvar, Sanski Most, Kljuc, and Jajce, are ethnically cleansing northwestern Bosnia of all non-Serbs. Most of the 994 refugees—largely women, children, and the elderly, 56 of whom were Croats—spent last night in a temporary reception center in Davor. The government's office for refugees and displaced persons, in agreement with the Ministry for Refugees and Social Affairs of the government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, provided buses for their transfer today. Croats were taken to Glamoc and Bosniak Muslims to the Una-Bihac canton. According to unofficial UNHCR figures, there are around 30,000 non-Serbs, including around 3,000 Croats, in the still occupied Banja Luka area and elsewhere in northwestern Bosnia.

According to a statement by Alojzije Kircevic, head of the Davor municipality, Bosnian refugees will not be accepted in Davor as of tomorrow.

EC Head Has 'Frank and Open' Talks With Walesa

LD2609105895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1037 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 26 Sep—The European Union will make all "possible and necessary" efforts leading to a positive conclusion to the process of Poland's integration within the Union, Jacques Santer, president of the European Commission, said today after his talks with President Lech Walesa.

He stressed that the talks with the president were frank and open.

Lech Walesa told journalists that the arguments presented by the interlocutors were appreciated by both sides. The president stressed that, if we talk, European unification will come closer. Today, it is not a question of whether we think about one continent; we have to talk about how to achieve this goal, Walesa stressed.

Prime Minister Attends ILO Conference in Warsaw

LD2509205395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2024 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw, Sept. 25—Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy was the guest of the Monday debate of the fifth European regional conference of the International Labour Organization [ILO] now being held in Warsaw.

Opening the debate, Director-General of the International Labour Office Michel Hansenne said that one of the ILO tasks is to build just and humanitarian societies, that is such where democracy refers to social and economic issues equally to political ones. According to Hansenne, the ILO role consists in safeguarding that the economic advancement is accompanied by the implementation of the basic social rights.

Addressing the delegates, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy said that it is a policy of the Polish Government to above all seek harmony of the rigours of the economic growth and its stability with preserving the minimum social safety and a just division of the costs of transformations.

The prime minister said the government puts emphasis on deep transformations of the system of services and social allowances. "The government wants to prevent social reforms from transforming them into an arena of political disputes and bargains," Oleksy said. The government is guided by the assumption that those matters should be responsibly agreed upon by all important political parties. In his opinion, important role in this field may be played by the Catholic Church, traditionally and fruitfully involved in the implementation of social tasks in Poland.

The prime minister stressed that for three years the Polish economy has been witnessing a fast pace of economic growth. He pointed out the increasing industrial output and profitability of enterprises, decreasing inflation and unemployment rate and the narrowing state budget deficit.

Head of the National Labour Office Andrzej Pilat answered to critical remarks made during the conference by Solidarity trade union representative Michal Wojcik. Pilat said that Solidarity stuck to the idea "all or nothing" and that it has a vision of a democratic Poland but without those who created it in 1989 and not for them. He recalled that the Solidarity idea failed to gain the social support in the 1993 parliamentary elections.

Oleksy Stresses Need To Modernize Army

LD2609095895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0907 GMT 26 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 26 Sep (PAP)—Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy said today before the weekly government meeting that the state of the armed forces was discussed yesterday during a meeting at the General Staff headquarters.

"It was very important to me that I had an opportunity to familiarize myself in detail with the Army's current needs and the delays in meeting them," Oleksy said. He added that this will form an important "background" for government discussion on defense matters. The Council of Ministers is working on a reply to the Sejm on implementation of the resolution concerning state defense. Oleksy wants the government to discuss the issue today.

The prime minister believes that the Army's technological standard is "highly unsatisfactory" both from the point of view of requirements on the road to NATO and defense capabilities.

Oleksy stressed that modernization of the armed forces cannot be achieved in a year and that this is a matter for many years to come. "Changes that will improve the present state of affairs must be defined today," he added.

The prime minister said work is under way to prepare a five-year program of technical equipment for the Army.

Military Daily Reports on Military Arms Fair

WS2209131995 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 19 Sep 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Ryszard Rogon: "Fifth International 'Military Arms 1995' Fair of Military Technology: More Maritime Than Ground"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *More than 160 Polish and foreign exhibitors will present their products at the Fifth International "Military Arms '95" Fair of Military Technology in Gdynia; the fair is beginning today. The center of the entire exhibition is housed in hangars at the Navy airport in Babie Doly. Some of the equipment will be presented outside the buildings. They are officially under the auspices of the minister of national defense of the Polish Republic. The fair will end on Friday, 22 September.*

The list of the companies that are to participate in the fair suggests that the electronic-telecommunications branch will be represented most widely. This goes particularly for our domestic companies. Aside from offers from the Industrial Telecommunications Institute and the Military Communications Institute, there is an interesting offer from the Polish Alcatel as well. It is a well-known fact that this company is competing on our market with the French Thompson. They want to sell thousands of tactical radio stations and a considerable amount of other communications equipment; they each want to put in the best bid. Our Armed Forces need this equipment more than the F-16 aircraft. At this point, we should correct a piece of information that appeared in POLSKA ZBROJNA a few days ago: In the Netherlands, the company that won the bidding to sell communications equipment to the Dutch Army was Thompson, not Alcatel.

Also, the biggest Polish companies that specialize in broadly understood communications have their pavilions at the exhibition: the RADMOR Radio Plant, the FAREL Electronic Plant, and the RADWAR Professional Electronics Science and Production Center. The computer and multimedia branch is represented by well-known foreign companies: the American Hewlett Packard and the German Siemens.

The Swedish CelsiusTech has interesting offers, particularly for our Navy. The weapon command and control system [system dowodzenia i kierowania bronia] for fast surface sea units may be the basis for modernizing such equipment on our ships. Bofors, another famous company, has prepared an armaments offer for the Navy: 40-millimeter guns, with which the state-of-the-art Swedish corvettes and frigates are equipped.

Pavilions occupied by Polish companies that guarantee logistic support for the Polish Armed Forces look very impressive. Thus, in Babie Doly one can find products of such companies as the Lublin Leather Industry Plant SA, the Modus Clothing Factory, the Lubawa Special Clothing Plant, the RAFIO Clothing Plant, the Beskidy Textile Institute, the Maskopol Protection Equipment Plant, and the PROGAZ Fire-Fighting Equipment Plant.

Marek Profus, the richest Polish citizen, also has a pavilion at the fair. It is worth recalling that Profus Management is a company that trades in so-called special equipment and strategic materials; its partners are our eastern neighbors. Its offer is especially attractive. It includes fuels, liquids, military parts and equipment, tanks, warships, and state-of-the-art aircraft such as MiG-29 planes.

Equipment for tanks is manufactured in such Warsaw-based companies as the PZL WOLA Mechanical Plant and the Industrial Optics Center [PCO]. The former manufactures modern engines that are used in tanks and tracked armored carriers, whereas PCO prepares the equipment that is the most expensive in armored vehicles: electronic fire-control systems. Currently, new projects in this area are most often carried out jointly with foreign companies. For example, the improved fire-control system in the PT-91 Twardy has been developed with the help of the Israelis. A similar French system manufactured by the SAGEM company, which is much better than the previous ones, proved to be too expensive for us for the time being.

We should also mention that the CENZIN GROUP has its pavilion at the "Military Arms" fair. Products presented by this firm compete directly with the products of such companies as the Spanish ASTRA, the Austrian GLOCK, and the Finnish LAPULA.

Numerous representatives of academic and scientific-research centers have come to Babie Doly as well. They include employees of the Warsaw Technical Academy, the Mechanics and Construction Institute of the Warsaw University of Technology, the Military Institute of Technical Equipment, and the Development and Research Department of the Maritime Technology Center. We should also mention the Naval Academy, which is one of the organizers of a conference that accompanies the fair: the Third International Scientific Symposium, which is largely devoted to military maritime subjects.

The Folk Expo Center Ltd., organizer of "Military Arms '95," expects many guests from all over the world. These visits may contribute to the expansion of international cooperation between our companies and foreign firms. On the first day of the fair, it is appropriate to wish all of the participants many favorable contracts.

Further on Arms Fair

WS2209145795 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 20 Sep 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Ryszard Rogon: "An Offer for the Navy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Among the companies that are taking part in the Fifth International "Military Arms '95" Fair of Military Technology, there are many firms that have come to Gdynia to submit concrete offers, especially for our Navy. To a certain extent, the site of the fair determines its scope and market. Many of the offers can already today serve as the initial material that might help prepare documents on modernization of our maritime Armed Forces.*

The most interesting offers have been submitted by the Swedish Celsius and the French Thomson. Both projects concern surface ship fire command and control systems. Such a system consists of many computer devices and radars that are interconnected by means of a special communications system. This makes it possible to collect data in no time at all and to assess correctly the combat situation in a relatively short time. This assessment may concern antiaircraft defense, surface and underwater combat, mining, aircraft control of a given airspace [lotnicza kontrola obszaru powietrznego], and sea search and rescue operations.

Multifunction onboard ship systems—the Swedish-made 9LVMk3 and the French-made DR 3000—make it possible to detect targets (as well as all kinds of dangers) very quickly, make a decision, and use the right weapons; the system also takes into account the biggest probability of hitting the desired targets. Both systems may prove fully efficient only if they are used together with modern strike and electronic camouflage equipment.

Participants at the fair are presenting not only command systems. Manufacturers of traditional firing weapons are also fighting for customers. This weaponry includes, for example, personal weapons.

The best-known European pistol makers present at the fair are the Spanish Astra and the Austrian Glock. Collectors are not the only ones familiar with the small arms manufactured by these companies. Police and special services of many countries (including Poland) are often equipped with products made in Vienna. However, our modern domestically made pistols actually match models manufactured by famous Western companies—both their outer appearance and their technical parameters do not differ much.

Lapula, a Finnish manufacturer of ammunition, is also present at the fair. Even though it specializes primarily in the production of ammunition for hunters, it is modernizing its production and offering increasingly more products. They are readily bought by both the Americans and the Japanese. This year the group of Japanese businessmen and manufacturers in Babie Doly is exceptionally numerous. Most of the firms they represent are completely unknown in this part of Europe. It turns out, however, that, aside from electronics and the automobile industry, there are other areas where this country has achieved a lot.

As far as the better known foreign arms companies are concerned, our southern neighbor is represented by Ceska Zbrojowka, Switzerland by Oerlikon-Contravas, the Netherlands by Signaal, and the United States by Defense News [the latter company is rendered in English]. Sweden is represented by more industrial-defense concerns than any other country. Aside from the aforementioned Celsius (Bofors is part of it), participating in the fair are also Ericsson, Hagglund Vehicle, Saab, Volvo, and Scania.

The French are trying to attract attention by exhibiting a whole set of missiles manufactured by Aerospatiale Missile. Navy servicemen are being offered modernized versions of the famous EXOCET missile.

In all, nearly 90 foreign companies from 16 countries have come to Gdynia to take part in the fair. It is a pity that the organizers failed to attract firms from across our eastern border. The hosts are expecting directors of armaments companies from the Siberian oblast to visit the fair, but it is not the same as presenting specific products.

Ministry Wants Fewer Telecommunications Operators

WS2609115195 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25 Sep 95 pp 1, 10

[Article by Dorota Margas: "Communications Ministry in Favor of Decreasing the Number of Private Telecommunications Operators; Ministry Clears the Field"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Communications Ministry wants to take away telecommunications licenses from all of the independent operators who have not made any investments yet. Deputy Communications Minister Stanislaw Popiolek declared that "the clearing of the field" is bound to continue until the end of the year. Private operators of local networks complain that what impedes their investments is not a shortage of money, which is suggested by the ministry, but the bureaucracy and envy of the Polish Telecommunications SA [TP SA].*

In line with Article 4 of the law on communications, telecommunications operations are performed by the following: TP SA, organizational units subordinate to the ministers of national defense and internal affairs (only in the area of their own needs, satisfied by their own telecommunications networks), an organizational unit under the foreign affairs minister, which satisfies the needs of the Polish diplomatic services, as well as companies that have obtained permission (licenses). The law on communications also envisions a monopoly on the rendering of international and domestic long-distance call services of a universal character. Since 1990, private operators independent of TP SA have been allowed to set up so-called local telephone networks.

So far, the Communications Ministry has given private operators 155 telecommunication licenses of various types: 72 licenses for universal services in the public telecommunications network, 62 licenses for services in internal networks, and 21 licenses for nonuniversal services. However, the Communications Ministry is not satisfied with the activity of private operators.

"The date 7 July this year, when the amended law on communications entered into law, was a good occasion to review the telecommunications licenses that had been issued and to see how the Polish People had benefited from them," says Deputy Communications Minister Stanislaw Popiolek. The ministry stated that 15 operators have not made any investments, and, for this reason, in five cases the licenses have been revoked. In nine cases the ministry has instituted administrative proceedings. "This is a restrictive policy, but, in the case of many of those who have telecommunications licenses, we do not even hope that they will start operations and meet the commitments they have made. Some of them applied for a license just to give it to some other firm later on," he explained at a session of the Sejm Transport and Communications Commission.

Before beginning the work on bidding procedures, we want to clear the field or, to cut a long story short, take licenses away from those companies that will certainly not meet their commitments. The minister did not reveal the names of the companies the ministry intends to deprive of their licenses.

It Is Counting and Shrinking

At one conference, Communications Minister Andrzej Zielinski said that he was counting on private operators. According to him, if private operators did their best, they might provide telephone service to approximately 1 million people by the year 2000. Meanwhile, private operators received the operation announced by the minister as a desire to shrink the market, which is not well developed anyway. Private operators do not agree with the charge—which the ministry likes to level at them—that they do not have enough money to get their companies going. According to them, both the Communications Ministry and TP SA are interested in decreasing the number of private operators. They stress that it is not a real problem to obtain a telecommunications license. "A veritable hurdle race and a war of nerves begin when it comes to talks with TP SA," they say.

TP SA does not intend to give up its monopoly. "It sees us as a very dangerous competitor only," they say. "When an operator receives a license for some area, TP SA is immediately there, even though before that it did not intend to install telephones there at all. The operator determines all of the technical and financial conditions with the director of a given TP SA district, but the agreement is signed with the board of TP SA. The operators complain that the board of TP SA is doing its best not to sign agreements with private operators on mutual settlements for telephone connections. The board also does not respond to letters from the operators in which they urge TP SA to expedite matters."

Telekom Silesia SA of Ruda Slaska negotiated the principles of cooperation with TP SA from July 1994 to February 1995.

Even though the conditions of the final agreement were given initial approval by the private operator and TP SA, the board of the latter did not approve of it. The agreement was accepted by its branch departments.

In early February of this year, an agreement on cooperation was initially approved for the first time. On 30 March, the second version of the agreement was approved, and on 22 April the third. First Telkom Silesia representatives were told that technical amendments were necessary; then they were told that the conditions their company had negotiated were too favorable to it, and then TP SA wanted another version of the agreement because purely graphic changes were needed. According to the operator, the last version was not changed at all.

Iliescu Discusses Relations With Hungary

AU2509190295 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 23 Sep 95 p 7

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by Gabor Szenyi and Gabor Lambert in Bucharest on 20 September: "Stressing the Mutually Acceptable Elements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [MAGYAR NEMZET] Mr. President, in connection with Hungarian-Romanian relations, the Franco-German reconciliation is often mentioned as an example, based on the success of Adenauer and de Gaulle in raising bilateral relations above the level of the European legal system and customs prevailing at the time. What elements in your new initiative of historic reconciliation show the same direction?

[Iliescu] I referred to the Franco-German example because, in the course of history, the conflict between these two countries was regarded as unsolvable. There had been a traditional conflict between these two major European powers, which had become the source of various other conflicts, including the two world wars. In spite of all this, after World War II, France and Germany succeeded in opening a new era in their relations and developing natural good-neighborly relations; moreover, they became the center of the growing European community, in spite of their earlier conflicts, which had seemed to be unbridgeable. I think Romania and Hungary have even better chances of developing good-neighborly relations based on mutual confidence. We are not major powers and we have both suffered under foreign rule; in the course of their history, both nations have had to fight for their national existence, their independence, and their sovereignty. Besides, among simple Romanian and Hungarian people, one can find numerous examples of good understanding and coexistence, despite the tribulations of history. Therefore, in the spring of 1990, I personally was surprised by the intensity of certain voices that maintained the conflict situation. I also had a lot of Hungarian friends and I know of many concrete cases of friendship between Romanians and Hungarians; our family has also been in touch with Hungarians all the time. Therefore, it seems to me that this intensified hostility is artificial. On the other hand, there are no conflicts between our two countries at the moment. Our cooperation is normal and natural in many areas; the volume of economic relations is the highest among all the neighboring countries; human contacts are not hindered by any difficulty; we have dismantled the obstacles represented by the borders that separated our two countries. In the military sphere, our relations are quite good and this strengthens mutual confidence and dispels suspicion. Our two countries are involved in similar processes and are making great efforts to place life on new foundations, strengthen democracy, and create a viable and competitive market economy. I think, therefore, that we are fully interested in eliminating any shadow from our relations and in strengthening our good neighborly relations, mutual confidence, and cooperation, and in making Romanian-Hungarian cooperation a constructive and positive factor for stability in our region, just as the Germans and French succeeded in doing this.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] We fully understand the intention, but so far negotiations on signing a bilateral basic treaty have been conducted in the same framework. What made it necessary for you to come up with new initiatives before we could sign the basic treaty, initiatives that might give a new direction to our dialogue?

[Iliescu] We came up with the new initiatives precisely to stimulate the negotiations on the basic treaty. As early as this week, we want officially to submit several documents to Hungary's political leadership and especially a political statement in which the two countries would express their will and desire to transgress the momentum of reservations, reticence, and suspicion and to promote open and sincere relations of friendship and cooperation. Let us turn the Romanian-Hungarian cooperation into the center of stability and development in our region. I am convinced that we can achieve this with the political will.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] The Hungarian public knows that the negotiations on the proposed basic treaty became bogged down because of differences of views on very concrete issues, principally because of the debate on the interpretation of Recommendation No. 1201 of the Council of Europe. On what European legal norms would the attitude codex toward the national minorities included in your proposals be based?

[Iliescu] Recommendation 1201 is not a legal norm either. It is a proposal that has no legal authority and it is well known that many countries rejected it; not entirely, of course, because it contains numerous stipulations that have become part of legal documents, but particularly Articles 11 and 12, which led to various interpretations, have not been universally accepted. This is what hindered negotiations on the basic treaty. Thus, we want to discard everything that can lead to suspicion and different interpretations. In our opinion, these two unclear formulations in this proposal lead to some separatist and discriminative efforts, which opposes the European spirit followed by both countries. Therefore, we want to negotiate on a very concrete basis and to identify the points that can be mutually accepted in harmony with European criteria.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] If we understand this correctly, the proposed texts are postponing precisely the debated issues that have hindered the signing of the basic treaty so far....

[Iliescu] No. The proposal is to stress only the elements that can be mutually acceptable. We do not have any illusions that we will immediately solve every issue that we inherited from history, even by signing the basic treaty. However, it would not be good to allow us to be paralyzed by problems that are interpreted differently. We must find a common platform that will help us advance, so that we no longer mark time.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] As far as we can follow this in Hungary, this kind of approach has received wide support among the Romanian political parties.

[Iliescu] I have just convened a meeting with the heads of all the parliamentary parties to consult them and ask the opinions of the entire political spectrum represented in Parliament. With certain slight differences that are quite natural, basically, everyone agrees in principle with this initiative. And everyone hopes that we will get a positive answer from the Hungarian side.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Does this mean that the Romanian concepts formulated in these initiatives represent the maximum that we can reach in the bilateral relations until the elections, given the current domestic Romanian political conditions?

[Iliescu] We are not talking about maximum or minimum here; instead, we are talking here about a political message, namely, that every Romanian political force wants to step over the obstacles that hinder the normalization of the atmosphere and the broadening of bilateral relations.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] However, what would be the relations of these three documents to one another and the basic treaty? Is it possible for the two sides to accept these three documents together, or only focus on one of them, while postponing the other two, or continue negotiations on the basic treaty irrespective of these three documents?

[Iliescu] Or the two sides would accept all of them together. For the time being, we are talking here about a proposal, a Romanian negotiation proposal. The Hungarian side might approach them in different ways: They might accept some of them and reject others. We are open to any solution. I myself am extremely flexible. I have never connected any high-level meeting to preconditions or preliminary documents and I was really surprised by the reservations shown by some Hungarian leaders when I proposed to meet at any time. I do not see why heads of state or government should connect their meeting to preliminary agreements. High-level meetings can only be encouraging signs in bilateral relations. When talks became bogged down because of certain views, I felt that such proposals were necessary, proposals that can help us clarify matters or at least express bilateral desire for progress. Actually, if we take a look at what de Gaulle and Adenauer signed, we see two documents. The first was a political declaration in which the two sides expressed their political will to put an end to the tense times and to promote good-neighborly relations and cooperation. The other document was a technical agreement that covered the major areas of bilateral cooperation and outlined the mechanism for regular meetings between heads of states, government heads, and ministers. These documents did not address any political or ideological problems that might cause tension. Our agreement proposal that we submitted along with the political declaration is similar to this.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] But relations between France and Germany were not burdened by the national minority problem in the way that Hungarian-Romanian relations are.

[Iliescu] As this problem is nonexistent in Romania, we do not have the concept of a national minority, either. Every German who lives in France and has taken French citizenship is regarded as a French national; similar to the situation prevailing in Hungary. Every French person who lives in Germany and is a German citizen has become German. Only we in Romania treat the national minorities in a separate category and with special rights in a political, cultural, and spiritual line, something that does not necessarily happen in Hungary. Hungary has had only one policy, namely to assimilate the national minorities and to eliminate their national identity. Only 10,000 ethnic Romanians are left from the 250,000 ethnic Romanians who lived in Hungary immediately after the Trianon Agreement. But we have never made an issue out of this. Every country has the right to resolve its relations with its own citizens in the best way it sees fit. I think that we in Romania have done the most for the national minorities, even more than the requirements stipulated in international and European documents. Therefore, I am surprised at the intensity with which some people in Hungary speak of the assimilation and oppression of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, which is not true. There are things here in Romania that the Romanians in Hungary do not have, namely 39 seats in the Romanian Parliament; Hungarians are proportionally represented on local councils on the basis of local government elections; there is a whole network of schools with education in the Hungarian language at all levels, Hungarian cultural institutions, Hungarian press, radio, and television stations, etc. What do the Romanians in

Hungary have? The high school in Gyula [in eastern Hungary] is called a Romanian High School. What kind of Romanian high school? Everything is taught in Hungarian, with a single subject taught in Romanian, namely the Romanian language course. Can we compare the two situations? On what moral basis do you then talk about the oppression of ethnic Hungarians in Romania? I think such attitudes and such approaches should be discarded, attitudes that are neither objective nor realistic and, naturally, they cause reactions that are natural.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] We would only like to add to this that, as interviewers, it would not be really correct to argue with you on the number of ethnic Romanians living in Hungary and the number of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania, as this is the task of historians or politicians. So, instead, we would like to focus on concrete issues that burden our bilateral relations....

[Iliescu] I agree.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Mr. President, in the Hungarian Radio's Romanian language program, you said that the education law was in accordance with the European spirit, but this did not mean that it was perfect and it was not possible to change it, but that the time had not yet come for these changes. What possibilities can you see to refine the law and what forums do you use to do this?

[Iliescu] This law has only just been enacted. We cannot talk about improving a newly accepted law that took five years to draw up. It went through various versions. Discussions were started on it as early as 1990 in the Parliament's relevant committees, and experts on higher and middle-level education were always consulted. Therefore, it had gone through many phases of talks and improvements before it was presented to the two houses of Parliament for debate, where it was finalized this summer. The law summarizes the results of five years of discussions and analyses, including the suggestions of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] and the National Ethnic Minority Council, which are reflected in the separate chapter devoted to education in the national minorities' language. I do not believe that you in Hungary have anything similar to this, as education in the language of the national minorities does not even exist in your country; therefore, you do not have any experience that you could use in this area. Therefore, our law could only draw on our own experience. In my view, the law is a result of extensive debates, the existing experience, and consultations with European institutions that deal with national minorities. No law can be seen to be perfect. They are the results of human activities and all human activities can be made more perfect. However, life creates the need to perfect them. Therefore, the law first has to be implemented and its instructions applied in the practice of school activities and only the experience of a few years of application will raise the need to perfect it. However, from the point of view of the Hungarian minority or the minorities in general, I do not believe that it would be justified to see the law as limiting in any way. And I do not think that many countries exist in Europe in which national minorities have the same possibilities that the Hungarians, the largest minority in Romania, have through the whole network of mother tongue educational establishments. Therefore, in addition to not having any discrimination or limitation, on the contrary, in my view, possibilities exist that tend not to exist in other countries. Certainly not in Hungary.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] If this was created through a consensus, then how can you explain the protest with which the Hungarian minority has greeted this law?

[Iliescu] It was not a consensus but a democratic debate, as it usually is in Parliament. Every effort was made for the law to take into consideration the most varied requirements, and in coordinating this it is not easy to come to an agreement. The RMDSZ's objections in this respect are excessive and do not have a realistic basis. Of course, this is my personal opinion and life will justify or contradict the correctness of certain paragraphs of the law.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Leaders of the Hungarian historical churches sent a letter to you two months ago in connection with the returning of church property. They have not yet received a reply. Will there be an answer and what will it contain?

[Iliescu] This is not a particular case, it is a more general issue that has to be assessed in the full context of property rights issues. What was called the secularization of the assets of monasteries took place during Prince Cuza in the second half of the 19th century, when the huge estates and forests in the property of the Orthodox Church came into state ownership. Several changes were also made in property rights between the two world wars and then again after World War II. These changes did not only affect one category of institutions or citizens. This is not a simple issue. History cannot be turned back. These are rather delicate issues and can only be handled in a very concrete way, by taking into consideration the general framework in which the returning of the assets can be implemented. It cannot be handled in isolation because it can create a whole chain reaction. And how far back in history should we go with the returning of assets? If we look at the history of mankind, we can see that it consists of white men swarming into other continents. What would happen if the indigenous population announced its claim to all goods that had been taken away by the colonizers or the European immigrants? And how many more problems would exist throughout the world and in Europe? Therefore, these issues have to be handled with great care, taking into consideration the demographic, structural, and other changes that have since taken place. This is not an issue pertaining to one or other church or community.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Recently, a group of Romanian opposition intellectuals said that the stance of the Romanian authorities is contrary to the statements on conciliation. The National Romanian Unity Party, which is in the government, termed the RMDSZ as a fascist-type organization and it wants to remove it from politics....

[Iliescu] The most varied opinions are expressed in a free and democratic society. From this point of view, this is not surprising either in Romania or in Hungary. We were also baffled when we heard on television what had been said at the Budapest rally, particularly by a government party and other responsible parliamentary parties' deputies. However, we do not judge Hungarian society or the responsible institutions of the Hungarian state through the statements of certain politicians. The same applies to Romania.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] A book was recently published with government support on the persecution of Transylvania's Romanians by the Hungarians. Furthermore, on 19 September, the Romanian Parliament accepted an amendment to the Romanian Penal Code making hoisting the flag of another country and singing its national anthem crimes to be punished yet again by serious imprisonment. Does all this not contradict the official policy that has made conciliation its goal?

[Iliescu] First of all, I do not see why these two issues should be linked. They are two separate issues. The first is a sociological field study that describes certain real conditions; it should make people think, also at the level of local and central administration, in connection with situations to which a solution has to be found. We believe that it is our obligation to handle such problems with attention, even when it comes to solving certain difficulties and restricted legal rights of people belonging to a national minority, and these solutions indeed have to be found, and it must be made easier to meet justified demands; however, the same applies to Romanians living here [in Hungary], who are deprived of the right to learn their own language in their own country. Or from asserting their national existence. In their own country! Such situations do exist. Therefore, this issue is not connected to interstate relations in any way at all. As to the issues discussed in Parliament, I have not yet seen the accepted wording; this applies to practices that have created reactions among the population and have lent nationalist emphases to certain offending phenomena. This does not mean that the national symbols of other countries would not be suitable at official events and when events of other states are commemorated. This is one thing, but it is another when such issues become sources of inciting antagonistic feelings.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Would conciliation be helped by some concrete gestures, such as a presidential pardon for Pal Cseresznyes, for whom international organizations have also raised their voice?

[Iliescu] The president exercised clemency when, years ago, he pardoned some people convicted over the December 1989 events. The international media also showed Cseresznyes in connection with the Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] events. When a man was lying unconscious on the ground and people were attacking him and beating him up, Hungarian and European television stations showed this as the vandalism and barbarity of the Romanians against Hungarians. When it came to light that the victim was a Romanian shepherd, you can imagine what reaction this created in the Romanian public. Cseresznyes was justifiably convicted for this at the time. At this moment, it is not possible for me to come into conflict with the legal authorities. The high court has discussed the possibility of a retrial and has rejected it. Of course, a change in the atmosphere might lead to this kind of outcome.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Mr. President, burying the past could precisely be a basis for historic conciliation. A large section of Hungarian society also feels that Romanian society's making peace with the 2 million strong Hungarian minority living here is either a precondition for an interstate agreement or it should be carried out parallel to it.

[Iliescu] The main point is conciliation between the two states and we are discussing the bases of the two countries' conciliation with the leaders of the Hungarian state. As for contacts with Romanian citizens, regardless of their nationality, it is in the Romanian state's interest for normal relations to emerge within the framework of Romanian society and that all citizens of Romania should feel at home in Romania. We do not need foreign impulses for this; this is primarily our own interest. However, it is undoubtedly true that bilateral relations based on mutual confidence can also have a favorable effect on domestic calm. At the same time, the development of relations within Romanian society and the strengthening of the democratic atmosphere can become favorable factors. The same way, the national minorities can also become linking factors, strengthening mutual trust.

[MAGYAR NEMZET] Next week, you will be visiting the United States. At the beginning of the summer, when Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn was there, among other things you said that you saw a chance of signing the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty before Parliament's summer recess. The summer is gone and now, at the beginning of autumn, what message and prognosis are you taking to Washington?

[Iliescu] I was convinced that we would be able to sign the basic treaty before the summer because I considered the elements that caused the Hungarian reservations to be rather insignificant, and we could easily have overcome these if we had had agreement and it had been possible to give up certain inflexible stances. However, we are not going to the United States as though to Mecca or the Sublime Porte for it to approve our political activities. I will be holding talks with another state, which happens to be the world's biggest power, as leader of a sovereign state and from the position of a partner. I believe that the era is gone when we had to report to the Porte in Constantinople or to Moscow. We are in a different period in history and our relations with other states, regardless of their size, can only be partnership relations based on mutual respect.

Defense Minister Views Army Reform, Foreign Ties

AU2509155095 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 18 Sep 95 p 18

[Interview with Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Radu Tudor; place and date not given: "Interview Granted to Our Newspaper by Gheorghe Tinca, Minister of National Defense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tudor] The new statute on military personnel comes into force on 20 September 1995. What are the main provisions that entail fundamental changes in the professional life of the officers and men of the Romanian Army? I would particularly like you also to refer to the transfer of military personnel to reserve status and the age limit for generals. Are there any exceptions? What will be the situation of Generals Vasile Ionel and Paul Cheler, Admiral Angelescu, and General Harabagiu?

[Tinca] The law that you are referring to is one of the most important in the overall legislative framework of reform in the Romanian Army. The main ideas of the law is to restore the dignified appearance of military personnel, define their status in society, by taking into consideration the importance of their mission, and specify the duties and obligations of the military. It also aims at introducing certain criteria, which we want to be strictly observed, on assessing everybody's work, promotion, other moves that people make during their military careers, and matters pertaining to their retirement. All this is extremely important, because we want the personnel to be sure of their status and chance of success in their chosen profession. Anyhow, the legal basis has been created to ensure that we will no longer have high-ranking officers, including generals, who have reached their positions only because of their length of service or because they have ingratiated themselves with their superiors. I repeat, this is a legal basis for introducing a state of normality in this sphere. Everything now depends on the integrity and seriousness of those in charge of implementing the law.

Another aspect of the law is the material situation of military men in this transitional period and perhaps afterward, too.

Officers for whom we cannot guarantee service lodgings—there are many in this situation, particularly among the young ones—will have part of their rent covered by a housing allowance of up to 25 percent of their pay. Military personnel's spouses who have lost their jobs because their husbands have been transferred to other locations will receive an allowance of up to 30 percent of the pay of their husbands. Similarly, the military personnel decorated with the "Military Merit" order will be exempted from taxes from between 10 and 50 percent.

Of course, the law also stipulates obligations on military personnel, conditions for their retirement or transfer to the reserves, loss of military rank, and so forth.

As for generals, the law stipulates the age limit up to which they can remain on active service.

The first category of generals with one or two stars may stay in the army until the age of 62. Three- and four-star generals may stay until the age of 64.

After the law comes into force on 20 September, these provisions will apply to a relatively large number of generals. I cannot give you the number until the legal procedures are completed.

You asked me about Generals Vasile Ionel, Paul Cheler, and Harabagiu [the minister's cabinet chief]. The first three will be affected by the law and will be retired. As for the admiral, he has not yet reached retirement age.

I hope that my answer to your question will prove that the law has been understood and that it will be implemented from the very start, so as to avoid any suspicions.

[Tudor] The new law on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense is in the process of being approved. For the first time in Romania's history, it provides for the position of a civilian minister of defense. What will be his mission and areas of jurisdiction? What areas will remain under the direct jurisdiction of the chief of staff?

[Tinca] The draft new law on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense has been discussed for some time, because we want to find a formula, which, although perhaps not ideal, will allow the ministry to operate in the conditions of the current stage of the reform and within the general evolution of the mechanisms of a state based on the rule of the law. There is no doubt that we also draw our inspiration from the laws of other countries, but we cannot apply them "indiscriminately," because the ministry operates in Romania and, like any other country, we have our specific features.

In one variant, the draft law stipulated that the defense minister should be a civilian, but I maintained that allowance should be made for both options. As a rule, he should be a civilian, but a military man may also become minister. A political requirement should not be settled legally, because a law is supposed to be permanent.

Of course, the final decision may differ from my opinion.

The delimitation between the positions of minister and chief of staff is a more complicated matter. The difficulties arise from the fact that having a civilian minister is a new situation for us and neither the public at large nor the army as a whole are clear about and properly understand the jurisdiction of the minister and the chief of staff. Generally speaking, things seem pretty clear, but in practice certain disfunctions may arise, which, fueled by pride and political interests, might lead to unpleasant situations, as has already happened in several of the new democracies. So far such difficulties have not emerged in our case, because both I and the chief of staff maintain good cooperation, based on the desire to reach a common goal, namely the reform and modernization of the army. We managed to build a relationship based on mutual respect and good manners. I am convinced that the experience that we will gain from working in this way will lead to a harmonization of views on the provisions of the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Army, so that the final formula to be passed in Parliament can facilitate the normal functioning of the military institution. This is an extremely important point, because quarrels in the army might create the impression of a lack of seriousness, which would have a destabilizing impact not only on the military body, but also on the entire society. In my opinion, the people's trust in and empathy for the army must rely on the conviction that this basic institution of the state is serious and functions properly.

Nevertheless, to give a more direct answer to your question, you should retain this main idea: The General Staff must see to it that the officers and soldiers are doing their duty and that professionalism permeates the army as a whole.

The minister, be he civilian or military, will bear general responsibility for what is going on in the army and will ensure the implementation of the government's general policy, as well as the necessary resources for its equipment, technology, supplies, and so forth. He will be in charge of relations with the other armies; of maintaining links with Parliament within the framework of the exertion of the civilian control over the army; and, in general, of ensuring the intercorrelation between the army and other state institutions.

An important task of the minister is to ensure the link between the army and civilian society.

[Tudor] Given the existence of an austerity budget, the pay of the military is still rather low, their equipment is not satisfactory, the food is not what is should be, and there is a housing shortage. In this respect, how do you view the decision to reduce the budget of the Ministry of National Defense by 141 billion lei [L] in 1995?

[Tinca] Of all the shortcomings that you mention, the worst, which is causing me headaches and a feeling of frustration, is the housing problem. I am talking about service housing, because our economy is far from being able to help officers to build their own houses. I hope wholeheartedly that such times will also come.

Although we have a budget of profound austerity, the pay, equipment, and food, which are not yet what they should be, are still at a satisfactory level, compared with other institutions funded from the budget.

An officer must realize from the outset that he will never earn as much as a bank manager or clerk, a boss, or what we call business people or private shop owners; apropos the latter, I refer to them in the positive meaning of the word, so I should call them "businessmen." Anyhow, this is the situation everywhere in the world.

One should note that the reduction of the 1995 budget, which is totally unpleasant for us and comes at a very unpropitious time, does not affect the military men's pay, equipment, food, or the already insufficient housing allowance. Similarly, it does not affect the granting of facilities instituted by the Law on the Statute of Personnel. The exemption from taxes envisaged by the law will create a monthly hole in the budget, worth billions of lei, under the heading "incomes." Please remember that these were guaranteed incomes in the budget.

If you ask me where the L141 billion cuts will be made, I will tell you that they will primarily be taken from combat training and supplies. Regarding combat training, we will have to cope, as the army has done down the centuries, with smaller funds, hoping that our combat readiness will not be affected, despite all. You see, we keep appealing to the soldier's understanding and devotion. I hope that the time will come when we will call upon these qualities to strengthen the country's defense potential, not to keep getting out of various financial difficulties.

Regarding supplies, we will strive not to reduce the ridiculously small orders that we have placed with the national defense industry. However, we have reached agreements with our foreign partners to postpone our debt repayments for this year. Anyhow, these installments must be paid in 1996 and we believe that they will be added to the army's budget next year.

With discipline and better management and control, I believe that we could overcome this budget mutilation, too, if it were not for another difficulty, namely, the recent blocking of more than 20 percent of the already sparse funds available to us until the end of the year. Of course, this blockage is a preventative measure and it depends on the level of revenue in the country's overall budget. Therefore, I maintain that overcoming the current difficulties, not only by us, but also by other institutions, depends, among other things, on the way in which the economic agents will pay their obligations toward the state, avoid tax evasion, and no longer cheat the state.

I find it hard to believe in the patriotism and troubled sleep of certain people who are allegedly worried about the country's defense and security, but who do not hesitate to cheat the state or profit at its expense whenever the opportunity arises.

If we are concerned with the country's defense, then we must prove it not only by words, but primarily by fulfilling our civic obligations. We are all expecting the state to give us things, because that is why the state exists, to quote Caragiale [19th century Romanian playwright]. This is not true. I believe that the government will further include national defense among its priority targets and that this year's cuts are only due to certain urgent requirements in agriculture, at the Cernavoda nuclear power station, and other projects.

[Tudor] What is the situation of the contacts and contracts with Western companies manufacturing military technology and hardware? With which companies have concrete accords been finalized (Bell, Elbit, Marconi, etc.)? Do you also see a solution to the problem of the Romanian Army's MiG's from this angle?

[Tinca] You are tackling a subject about which I said that I would not make any further comment. At that time, I said that I would be stingier with my information, because that is exactly what the partner companies are doing. Consequently, I will give you a brief answer: The negotiations with Bell and Marconi are proceeding well and I hope that this will also be the case when we proceed to discuss the financing. Cooperation with Elbit [Israeli aviation company] has led to the first flight of a modernized MiG-21. However, the modernization of the MiG-21 fleet only solves part of the problems of the air force. For the other part, we are still assiduously searching for solutions. You know very well that solving all the problems of the Air Force is a much more complex and expensive matter, which can only be considered in the long run.

[Tudor] Mr. Minister, would you be so kind as to assess our military relations with the United States, the Russian Federation, and Hungary separately. What is the connection between these ties and Romania's chances of joining NATO?

[Tinca] Regarding the United States, our relations are very good. They are based on mutual interests. We have concrete programs, which are proceeding smoothly, and we already feel the need to expand them. With many U.S. companies, we have already gone past the initial phase of discussions on cooperation in the manufacture of military technology in our country. Within the framework of the Partnership program, we are also cooperating quite well. I believe that we are drawing closer to the end of the stage of mutual knowledge and trust building. I hope that these relations will lead to more concrete results in the future.

With the Russian Federation, we have agreements, we have exchanged mutual visits, and we respect each other, when we do not ignore each other, but the results are minor. I have sent several messages there to stimulate our cooperation with this great power, because we have multiple interests in building a correct, healthy, and productive relationship with the Russian Federation. However, the answers fell short of our expectations.

Quite often, I had the impression that our solicitude is being ignored, so as to create a pretext for them to be able to tell us that we are ignoring them or that we have turned our backs and are hostile to them, particularly when it comes to our integration into NATO. This may be only an impression. I am still hoping for a serious, civilized, and mutually advantageous relationship with a democratic Russia, as an active partner with a united Europe.

Regarding Hungary, our military relations are most advanced. We manage to achieve something that would have seemed an aberration a few years ago: a Romanian platoon and a Hungarian platoon carrying out joint maneuvers on Romanian and Hungarian soil. A similar exercise will also be held this year at the company level. I believe that the two armies are proving that the reconciliation between our countries is not a circumstantial proposal. I have a personal relationship with Mr. Keleti [Hungarian minister of defense] in which I am beginning to think that we both believe.

Of course, there is a connection between the nature of these relations and our chances of becoming members of NATO. The same is true of our relations with other states, such as France, England, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, Greece, Poland, the Czech Republic, and so forth. We want to join NATO together with other states and, if possible, at the same time as Hungary, by all means. Similarly, we must maintain and strengthen our dialogue with other countries, so as to know and understand the opinions and interests of all sides. It is not to anyone's benefit that NATO's expansion should take place under conditions of misunderstanding, suspicion, or hostility.

However, since you talked about Romania's chances of joining NATO, I would like to tell you that it primarily depends on us Romanians. Similarly, I would like to remind you that it is not armies, but countries with armies that join NATO.

It is difficult to say when this integration will take place. However, it would be a basic mistake if, given these debates on NATO expansion or the evolutional process, which is the Partnership for Peace, Romania were to isolate itself for whatever reason. Politics may speculate on emotions, but it can never rely on them alone.

[Tudor] Did you manage to reach a conclusion in the inquiries about the "Letter of the 300" [allegedly written by 300 officers, accusing Iliescu and various military figures of high treason, published by ROMANIA MARE on 23 June] and the accusations made against President Ion Iliescu?

[Tinca] The letter of the 300 turned out to contain awkward variations on real and known problems of the army, whose solutions cannot be found in a return to the past. It also contained insults against the country's president, who is also the army's supreme commander, hence it was also an affront to the army. From the start, the inquiry into the authenticity of the letter led nowhere. We could not identify a single active or reserve military officer who belonged to the group of 300. If I had weak nerves, I would have let myself be overwhelmed by the avalanche of negative reactions to this letter, which were reminiscent of the "stigmatization campaigns" of the not too distant past.

However, I would like to mention one thing. In this respect, I had several talks with Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor [owner and chief editor of the ROMANIA MARE weekly and president of the Greater Romania Party], after which he agreed to stop publishing unchecked items, although every newspaper is entitled to express any opinion that it likes. I would like to add that Mr. Tudor has so far kept his promise.

[Tudor] What is your opinion about Boris Yeltsin's statement that "NATO's expansion might lead to war throughout Europe"?

[Tinca] Your quotation is only an excerpt from what I suppose is a broader statement made by President Yeltsin. I have not read or analyzed it. Therefore, it should be checked to see what the true meaning is of the quotation that you mention. However, I have heard that President Yeltsin has left for a vacation in the Crimea, so I do not believe that there will be a war throughout Europe in the coming weeks. I believe that the Russian Federation's positions should be carefully examined, because they are the positions of a great power. At the same time, we should not forget that Russia is acting within a general political and military framework, so not everything that Russia says is bound to happen tomorrow. We respect Russia's positions and take them into consideration, but we also analyze the positions of others and the general trends manifest in Europe and throughout the world. Russia should not be isolated, but neither should it isolate itself. I am convinced that Russia is not interested in seeing war fever spread throughout Europe, just because central European countries are participating in the Partnership for Peace and want to join NATO.

[Tudor] At a certain point, you said that you would like to return to the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What position would you like to take up there? How do you feel at the head of the Romanian Army as a civilian, after almost 30 years in diplomacy?

[Tinca] You are probably referring to a statement that I made in Suceava, which was taken out of context. The matter is not topical, because nobody intimated to me that I should return to the Foreign Ministry headquarters. Even if this were to happen suddenly, I would not be surprised, because I am not glued to this position and my job is diplomacy, which I still hope to practice in the six years that are left until my retirement. If I were to pick my post, I would choose a cozier one, where you can prepare for the time after retirement, because all my life I have held only tough jobs.

How do I feel as a civilian in the army? As a stranger among friends, meaning that I feel well. I say a stranger, because the military profession is old and complex and the institution is huge. Nevertheless, I feel that I am among friends, Romanians like myself!

[Tudor] Thank you, Mr. Minister, and, on the occasion of your forthcoming birthday, I wish you "many happy returns" on behalf of EVENIMENTUL ZILEI.

Prime Minister Comments on Membership in EU

95BA0355D Trieste PRIMORSKI DNEVNIK in Slovene 1 Sep 95 p 11

[Unattributed STA article: "Slovenia Will Not Give In to Italian Pressures"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Alpbach (STA)—Yesterday morning Prime Minister Drnovsek, at a European forum in Austria's Alpbach, spoke about the expansion of the EU to include the countries of Central and East Europe. "Special conditions are being set for Slovenia, which is objectively already more highly developed than the majority of associate members, and associate membership is not even a guarantee that full membership will come about," Prime Minister Drnovsek warned.

"The year 2000 was the initial magic boundary for admission to the EU, but the closer it comes, the more uncertain it is whether any Central or East European countries at all will become full members of the Union in the near future," Drnovsek stated. He clarified the case of Slovenia, which decided upon independence because of the realization that most of the former Yugoslavia was not prepared to participate in the European processes of democracy and a market economy. Soon after independence, it signed an agreement on cooperation with the EU, but because of Italian obstruction, it still has not signed an agreement with the Union on associate membership. "In a way the EU's attitude toward Slovenia reflects trends from the past and raises the issues of future European relations," Janez Drnovsek thought in Alpbach. He explained that after recognizing Slovenia in 1992, Italy acknowledged its succession to the agreements concluded between the former Yugoslavia and Italy, including the Osimo agreements and the Rome agreement, which regulate the issues of the nationalized property of Italian emigrants. Slovenia expressed willingness to continue the payment of financial compensation for the nationalized property, but in 1994 Rome demanded the return of publicly owned real estate to the former Italian owners, and started to make settlement of this issue a condition for Slovenia's associate membership in the EU. "Italy is demanding a change in the agreements that regulate relations from the past and that are a result of prolonged negotiations and a compromise that could only be reached after decades," the Slovene prime minister emphasized. He warned that Slovene public opinion was extremely negative about such things and that it was arousing feelings that the "might makes right" principle, which Slovenia wanted to avoid in the former Yugoslavia, still prevailed in Europe. "Slovenes were surprised to realize that the EU was far from being an ideal democratic society, and that constant haggling went on in it," Drnovsek said, and wondered whether this meant the beginning of a revision of European history since World War II. Drnovsek explained that the Slovene Government was prepared to harmonize its legislation with European legislation, but in exchange for associate membership was prepared for the same degree of liberalization of property legislation that other associate members had. He warned about the growth of Euro-skepticism among Slovenes. On one hand, just as elsewhere in Europe, it was a consequence of various fears, for example in agriculture, and the other part of it came from the Italian demands and pressures. "What sort of motivation is associate membership?" Drnovsek asked, and added that associate membership was no guarantee of subsequent full membership. "The present cooperation agreement with the EU allows Slovenia satisfactory economic relations with the Union," the Slovene prime minister opined in Alpbach, and added that, objectively, Slovenia was already more highly developed than all the associate members and was already catching up to some of the full members, while at the same time it was closer to fulfilling the Maastricht standards than most of the EU members. Slovenia will continue to negotiate peacefully with the EU, and will not allow itself to be put under time pressures. It will build most on continued efficient economic development. "In the area of property legislation, the government will make the changes that are fair and justified, but will not give in to pressure," Drnovsek announced. "If necessary, Slovenia will clearly point out to the international community the immature and unprincipled behavior of certain countries," the Slovene prime minister added, and he warned the EU to reexamine the way in which it was acting, because otherwise there was a danger of a defeat for the idea of a united Europe. Yesterday morning, in working talks, Drnovsek met with Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schussl, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, and Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski.

Foreign Minister, Italy's Agnelli Meet at UN

AU2609084695 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler, together with his assistants and Ambassador Danilo Tuerk, head of the Slovene Mission to the United Nations, met with the delegation of the Italian Foreign Ministry, led by Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli last night. A meeting behind closed doors lasted for 45 minutes and Minister Thaler did not wish to speak about its details afterward. He only stressed that a solution had to be found within the framework of the Rome Treaty.

Foreign ministers of both countries in the talks reviewed the achievements in the negotiations on resolution of bilateral issues so far and agreed to hold a new meeting, which is envisaged to take place in the UN building today or tomorrow.

Defense Minister, Italian Counterpart Hold Talks

95BA0355A Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 7 Sep 95 p 9

[Article by Andrej Mrevlje: "Without Overtaking"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rome, 7 Sep—Slovene Defense Minister Jelko Kacin arrived in Rome yesterday for a two-day visit. The first world military games were opened yesterday evening at the Olympic stadium in Italy's capital, and on that occasion the Slovene defense minister also attended an honorary forum.

Even though there were a great many foreign ministers and high-level military guests in Rome during those days because of the military games, Italian Defense Minister Domenico Corcione found time yesterday morning and met with the Slovene defense minister. After three hours of talks, the Italian and Slovene sides issued a joint communique announcing that the two ministers had discussed international issues of common interest and that they had exchanged views on the present state of bilateral relations. "During the meeting," the joint communique said, "the foundations were established for initiating contacts between the two defense ministries, in order to study, in their mutual interest, all possible forms of cooperation between Slovenia and Italy in the sphere of defense."

Kacin later also agreed to a brief interview with representatives of the Slovene media. First of all he mentioned the frequent meetings with his Italian counterpart—they met last in June in Brussels—and the fact that Slovenia attributes great significance to relations with Italy, our only neighbor that is a full member of NATO. In addition to several concrete forms of cooperation of athletic and promotional significance, Minister Kacin said yesterday, a regular exchange of views was taking place between the two countries' centers for strategic studies. During the talks, the Slovene side raised the issue of exchanging military attaches. According to Kacin, Italian Minister Corcione agreed that both sides would continue preparations to exchange military representatives, but warned that the Italian Defense Ministry, in spite of its desire for closer cooperation, could not accelerate relations in the political sphere. As for the Slovene side, Minister Kacin said yesterday that Slovenia had no objections to closer and more operational cooperation with Italy in the defense sphere, and expressed regret to his host that Italy was lagging behind in cooperation with Slovenia in comparison with several other NATO members. According to Minister Kacin, Slovenia proposed last year that they conclude an agreement on cooperation between the defense ministries and that experts from both ministries now study the priorities and the areas that it should include. Furthermore, the Slovene minister welcomed Italy's decision to withdraw its military units from the Slovene border, even though they were not aimed against Slovenia, as Minister Corcione asserted. Precisely because there are no more disputed issues between Slovenia and Italy in the defense sphere, the Slovene minister expressed hope yesterday that defense cooperation with Italy could begin more quickly.

Krsko Power Plant Stops Working Due to Fault

AU2509181395 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Due to a fault in the instruments of the security waterfeed line, Krsko nuclear power plant automatically ceased operation at approximately 1030 [0839 GMT] today. As our correspondent Irena Majce reports, the fault has already been identified, namely, in the circuit that feeds the isolation valve of the prime steam. They are repairing the fault at the moment and expect that the plant will be reconnected to the electrical system tonight.

Federal

Belgrade Consults With Bosnian Serbs Before Talks

AU2509132795 Paris AFP in English
1304 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept 25 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leaders have held talks here with rump Yugoslav officials to discuss the standpoint which the Serb delegation should take at peace talks later this week, the Belgrade press said Monday.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Serb "parliament" speaker Momcilo Krajisnik arrived in the Serbian capital Sunday to thrash out with their proxy negotiators the constitutional demands the Serbs should make for their part of Bosnia, press reports said.

Rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is acting for the Bosnian Serbs in the peace process. The talks due to take place in New York Tuesday are scheduled to bring together rump Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic with his Bosnian and Croatian counterparts, Muhamed Sacirbegovic and Mate Granic.

However, the Bosnian party has already expressed its reluctance to take part in the talks—at which the three parties are expected to flesh out a U.S.-sponsored peace plan—fearing that the draft agreement on the table would give the Serbs the de facto right to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Belgrade press said Monday that Milutinovic would indeed be pushing for as much independence as possible from Sarajevo for the future Serb chunk of Bosnia.

The U.S. peace plan would give the Moslem-Croat federation 51 percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina against 49 percent for the Bosnian Serbs, proportions roughly reflecting the situation on the ground following the joint Moslem-Croat two-week offensive which has seen them recapture large swathes of Serb-held land in western and central Bosnia.

Monday, Bosnian Serb "defence minister" Milan Ninkovic said the joint offensive was petering out and that the Serbs had even taken the initiative at some points along the three principal front lines, according to the official Serbian TANJUG news agency.

Visit of Russian Delegation, Talks Viewed

AU2509212695 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Rybkin, president of the Russian State Duma, and the remaining members of a high-level Russian Duma delegation held talks with the deputies of the foreign affairs' commissions and commissions for foreign economic relations of both chambers of the FRY Assembly. Here is a report by Tamara Motrenko: [Begin recording] Emphasizing, among other things, that NATO acting as a peacemaker in the name of the United Nations constituted an attempt at usurpation within the framework of the resolution of the Balkan conflict, and conveying the views of the Russian State Duma, Ivan Rybkin said that such behavior would not pass unnoticed by Russia because this involved aspirations to a monopoly and the ruling position in the system of European and international security.

Rybkin also told the FRY Assembly deputies that Russia followed the tragedy in the Balkans with great concern and that the inadequacy of the United Nations' peacemaking policy was more than evident in this case. The theory put forward by the official UN representatives about the enforced aspect of the peacemaking is alien to the mediatory role of the international organization in ethnic conflicts and is unacceptable for the deputies of the Russian Duma, Rybkin said.

According to him, the UN Security Council and the Contact Group demonstrated that they were incapable of taking control of the development of events in the Balkans, and the use of force, such as Croatia's aggression against the Republic of Serbian Krajina, created a specific logic which also comprised the inclusion of the Rapid Reaction Force and large-scale NATO bombing.

According to the president of the Russian State Duma, this was a peculiar sort of competition in the effectiveness of the mechanisms of the United Nations and NATO. In connection with this, Rybkin warned some politicians about the danger of temptation to resolve the problem by force and military intervention on the side of one of the participants, which is unacceptable for the Russian Duma deputies.

The observed and anticipated consequences of the Balkan war are destructive for the entire system of the international and European security, Rybkin assessed. The stance of the Russian parliament, as Russian State Duma President Rybkin said, was particularly prominent at its 9 September special session this year when an end to the NATO bombing in Bosnia was demanded. The Duma, Rybkin reminded, on that occasion called on President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin to take urgent measures to prevent escalation of violence and encourage interested parties to abstain from the use of force and seek solutions at the negotiating table.

Indirectly, Ivan Rybkin also emphasized that Russian members of the parliament firmly support lifting the international sanctions against the FRY, for which a special law had been passed, as well as prevention of genocide of the Serbian people in Croatia.

The president of the Russian State Duma also spoke about the main tasks of the Russian parliament in its efforts for Russia, through implementation of numerous reforms, to become a modern, democratic, federative, legal, and social state.

After he ended his expose, Rybkin answered several questions by federal deputies, all of which hailed the guests from Russia and showed interest in Moscow's stance toward the overall resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, as well as their opinion about the consequences that the use of force in regional conflicts could have on international relations, peace, and security in Europe and in the world in general.

Rybkin said that Russian public opinion rejected a dictate of force and said that efforts for peace in the former Yugoslavia to be established through a consensus, as has been done so far, would continue to be undertaken at all levels of authority in Russia.

As for Russia's being ignored in passing some international decisions, Rybkin warned that Russia would know how to demonstrate its biggest strength precisely when somebody tries to corner her and that it would know how to chose the right moment for it. [end recording]

Duma Seen Supporting Milosevic

AU2509204895 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 25 Sep 95

[Statement by Ivan Rybkin, president of the Russian State Duma, after talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, in Belgrade on 25 September—recorded; in Russian with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is one thing I would like to say. The delegation in its full makeup emphasizes and supports—we have already discussed this—the political far-sightedness and endurance of Serbian President Milosevic. In the realm of a peaceful and all-encompassing solution, by acknowledging all sides in the conflict, we would like very much that everything the president envisaged and coordinated with all sides in the conflict through painstaking work, that all this becomes reality and produces results. We said that we would like very much for a visible result to be archieved at the meeting of the warring sides tomorrow so that the international community could start abolishing sanctions and restore the earlier scope of trade and economic cooperation. This is in the interest of everybody in Europe, and it is in the interest of everybody in Russia and Yugoslavia. This is the essence of our talks.

'Just' Settlement Sought

LD2509165195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1635 GMT 25 Sep 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept 25 (TANJUG)—Parliamentarians from Russia and Yugoslavia advocated here Monday the reaching, as soon as possible, of a peaceful and just settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and opposed the policy of force and double standards pursued by certain world powers.

The delegation of the Russian State Duma (lower house of parliament), headed by Duma President Ivan Rybkin, held talks with a delegation of Yugoslav parliamentarians headed by the president of the Yugoslav parliament's lower house, Radoman Bozovic.

At the talks, the parliamentarians of the two countries expressed a readiness to contribute to stability and security in the Balkans and in Europe.

Russian parliamentarians expressed their support to the consistent policy of peace of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

President Rybkin and members of the Russian delegation pointed to the importance of the lifting of sanctions against the FRY, and of its reintegration into the international community. In that sense, the State Duma will continue to exert efforts.

State Duma deputies stressed that the visit of their high-level delegation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as visits of previous delegations, symbolized moral support to Yugoslavia and that their goal was to contribute to the settlement of the crisis.

Yugoslav parliamentarians said they appreciated highly the principled and objective position of the State Duma since the breakout of the Yugoslav crisis and its huge efforts to end the crisis.

Lifting of Sanctions Advocated

LD2509161595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1550 GMT 25 Sep 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept 25 (TANJUG)—A delegation of the Russian State Duma expressed Russia's full support to the peace policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and is determined to continue to advocate the abandoning of the unilateral approach of the international community and the lifting without delay of sanctions against the FRY.

This was stated by the delegation, headed by duma (lower house) president, during talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, the office of the president of Serbia said.

The Russian State Duma delegation arrived on Sunday for a visit to the FRY.

At the talks, it was stressed that during the entire period of the crisis the FRY has been pursuing a consistent policy of peace, working for an end to the war in the Balkans, and that the best confirmation of its persistent efforts is the present speeding up of the peace process and the prospect of concluding peace at an international conference, expected to be held very soon.

Stressing the importance of the development of all-out cooperation between the FRY and Russia, it was assessed that the visit of the delegation of the State Duma at the highest level has given an impetus to the constant promotion and development of links between Yugoslav and Russian partners in a number of fields of common interest.

Federation Important for Peace

AU2509215995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Sep 95

[Report by Daniela Spasic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Following a meeting with the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Ivan Rybkin, president of the Russian State Duma, said:

[Passage omitted] President Milosevic was specific in his arguments. The members of the State Duma delegation were also able to participate in the talks with President Milosevic, and I believe they received firsthand replies.

When asked what were his impressions of the visit, Rybkin said the Serbian president felt confident and appeared to be decisive as well as resolved to proceed toward establishment of peace exclusively by acknowledging all interests in Bosnia. Milosevic is of the opinion that the interests of the Muslim-Croatian Federation must also be acknowledged to restore peace. We would not like to join the forces of war, Rybkin concluded.

Bulgarian Officials Show Support for Milosevic

AU2609084595 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 25 Sep 95

[Report by Vera Jankovic on news conference by a Bulgarian parliamentary delegation in Belgrade on 25 September—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Summing up the results of a several-day visit to our country at a news conference in Belgrade, the guests from Bulgaria emphasized the need to resolve the conflict peacefully and also to lift the sanctions against the FRY, which are not only hurting our country, but the neighboring countries, too. The Balkans must turn into a zone of peace and stability, Krasimir Premyanov, chief of the parliamentary delegation of the Democratic Left, said. Bulgaria, as a Balkan country, will make a special contribution here, he continued. We would like to emphasize that the entire Bulgarian nation supports the peace policy of your country and especially that of President Slobodan Milosevic, which is based on the Geneva Agreement. From its side, Premyanov emphasized, Bulgaria will help, with its state funds, the humanitarian situation in your country before the onset of winter. Concretely, we will use our funds to build a kindergarten for refugee children.

Our two countries will soon sign several agreements on all aspects of cooperation, ranging from culture to the economy.

Klara Marinova, president of the parliamentary commission for radio and television, showed gratitude for the extraordinary hospitality and said that the interests of the people and the politics that favor a peaceful resolution of the conflict should come first, leaving behind those who wish to resolve the problem—which is not only a Balkan problem, but also a European problem—with a war option.

Emphasizing the support for the peaceful policy pursued by the FRY, Marinova said that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have a lot in common and that a friendly future lies ahead of them.

Serbia

Milosevic Setting Up Security Service, Police

AU2509183095 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 95 pp 10-11

[Article by Gradisa Katic and Djoko Kesic: "The Special Police Will Strike at the Very Top of Corrupt Politicians and Policemen, but They Will Not Allow That Without Letting Blood Flow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In three months at the latest, a Yugoslav National Agency is to be formed in Belgrade, which will take care of Serbian and Yugoslav national and state interests. The project, which explains the realistic social need for the existence of such an agency, its organization, and its main goals, is already on the desk of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. President Milosevic is expected to approve of that project quickly, after certain consultations, because it was he who initiated the idea of forming the Yugoslav National Agency in the first place.

Anonymous but reliable TELEGRAF sources claim that Slobodan Milosevic ordered Radmilo Bogdanovic, chairman of the Serbian Assembly, to select tried and trusted people to work on this project. The gray eminence of the Serbian police has already done its work. The project has been completed, the people selected, and in the coming three months important technical, strategic, and organizational work is to be done.

"This time of war, to the great misfortune of the Serbian people, has shown that Serbia and the FRY did not have an adequate understanding or support from influential world organizations, lobbies, great world powers, and influential media. Shallow minds, particularly those responsible for securing a more acceptable world interpretation of the Serb struggle in Croatia and Bosnia, have reduced everything to the maxim 'the world hates the Serbs.' Had we had an agency which would use its diplomatic, informative, lobby, and media channnels to convince the world how to interpret the Serb struggle and the justness of its goals fairly, our position would be significantly different today. You can guess what it would mean if some world or local agencies had acquired and published information on what really happened in the Sarajevo massacres in Vase Miskina Street, at the Markale market place, and so on," says our anonymous informant, one of the authors of the project of the Yugoslav National Agency.

Another informant of ours, a coauthor in the project, goes even further by claiming that many of our top state officials have served various foreign intelligence and other agencies. It is no secret that it was precisely those officials who managed to engage the Social Security Service [SDB], people from the Public Security, in committing serious crimes "in the interest of the state."

TELEGRAF's reporters have had the opportunity to take a look at the project of the Yugoslav National Agency, which lists some of its priorities: "protection of the state and the citizens, protection of national secrets, creation of the first Yugoslav and pro-Serbian lobby in important international centers and organizations, creation and development of Yugoslav connections with influential international political and financial organizations, prevention of the outflow of capital outside of Yugoslav borders, prevention of the outflow of highly educated professionals, protection of scientific secrets, selection, education and orientation of talented children, secondary school and university students, collection of information on new technologies, development of new technologies in Yugoslavia, control of the work of Yugoslav companies abroad, collection of information on foreign companies, as well as on companies with which state and private companies make business, and finally—the creation of a special police force.

TELEGRAF's sources claim that the project to create the Yugoslav National Agency has tried to use all good solutions of similar agencies in the world. The experience and model of the Kintex agency has been particularly used. This agency, located in Sofia, formed six years ago under the auspices of the CIA and the KGB [as published], today operates as an ordinary trade company. Its creator is one KGB agent, who nearly 10 years ago made an analysis of possible political and social changes in the world, of which the impending disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia could clearly be recognized. In addition, one should bear in mind that Kintex provided weapons for all parties in the conflict in former Yugoslavia; for example, Croatia acquired the most modern air-defense equipment in that way, as our sources claim.

As is usual with similar world agencies and organizations, the Yugoslav National Agency will be out of the control of the Republic and Federal Assemblies, the state and public security authorities, the judicial and other state bodies. The agency will report on all its actions to the state president and keep in touch with the state public prosecutor, who will closely cooperate with the agency and cover its actions in front of the court and the public.

The public is particularly interested in the part of the work of the Yugoslav National Agency that relates to the creation of a special police force. In an exclusive talk with TELEGRAF, the author of the part of the project that relates to the special police, one of the most distinguished former policemen in the country, says:

"It is evident that the existing police and political structures are not capable of solving the numerous problems in our society, ranging from criminality, which has infiltrated the regime, to the system of combating crime. So, there will be a major conflict, a major struggle between organized crime with those politicians who cooperate with it against the new police. Because they wish to preserve their acquired positions, privileges, money, and power, they will not give up all that without spilling blood.

"Our interlocutor continues that, together with the creation of the special police, it will be necessary to change legal norms, including granting legal permission to provoke criminal acts and changes in the Law on Criminal Proceedings. Our society and citizens need to regain trust in the police, but things have gone so far that it is no longer possible without a special police force. With the first successes and the regained trust of the citizens, new possibilities of cooperation will be created. Only selected policemen will be able to join the special police; they will be located in a separate building, with special vehicles and a special system of communications. Protection for the families of the policemen must also be secured. The special police must have special communications with the special police forces of other countries. This is because, for example, Interpol information is known and read by many people, from secretaries to radio telegraphers and analysts. That is why there have to be special communications," our interlocutor adds.

Radmilo Bogdanovic Forms an Elite Police Unit

TELEGRAF's interlocutor points out that the idea about a special police force originates from President Milosevic himself, who has spoken out against crime many times. Now it is clear that what he had in mind then was the forming of such a police force. Later, leading opposition parties came up with the idea of the need to appoint a special public prosecutor, and a special public prosecutor requires the forming of a special police force. [sentence as published] Certain consultations on that were made with some representatives of the Democratic Party and the Serbian Renewal Movement. According to our information, Radmilo Bogdanovic has already formed a team of elite policemen who will soon start work in this national agency. Their names are being kept secret.

Bulatovic Calls Security Situation 'Stable'

LD2409200895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1114 GMT 24 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 24 Sep (TANJUG)—The security situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is good and stable, despite the fact that there has been war on our borders for over three years, Yugoslav Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic said today, speaking in the "Hallmark of Time" program on Kragujevac Radio.

Minister Bulatovic added that the war had had serious economic, social, and political effects on the country's population. "However, crimes such as the NATO bombing of Serbs in the Bosnian Serb Republic and the genocide over the Serbs in the Republic of Serb Krajina have done nothing to affect the vitality and tolerance of the Serb and Montenegrin people," he said.

"Peace is the FRY's overall commitment, and we must be even more decisive and forceful in drawing the international community's attention to it, whose help is crucial in achieving a lasting and just peace," Bulatovic said.

"I am convinced that all sides in the conflict have had enough of the war and that foreign agitators, who became involved in the war out of their own interests, have finally become aware of the danger of the war spreading. We want the international community, who is now behind all major moves and on whom the destiny of the Balkans depends, to fight for and to bring about a just and, by implication, a lasting peace," Bulatovic said.

He said that "we need a kind of peace that will enable current and future generations to live and create in harmony and freedom, and whose blood and lives will not be needed to rectify the mistakes and delusions of history."

"Of course, the world needs peace as a guarantee that the Balkans will never again be a potential troublespot or the source of new conflicts that will threaten not just the Balkans, but Europe and beyond," Bulatovic said.

He stressed that "vigorous steps are needed to end the conflict by diplomatic means as soon as possible and to localize it to ensure that it does not threaten world peace."

"The current peace initiative is the last chance for a just peace," Bulatovic said.

Asked if the NATO bombing had affected the efficiency and capacity of some of the Army of Yugoslavia vital systems and the system of our country's defense, in general, Minister Bulatovic said:

"Unfortunately, from the emotional point of view, their bombs with their destructive power have wounded the soul of each and every Serb and Montenegrin all over the world since they see them as a great injustice and an unprovoked crime. I am convinced that this demonstration of force, designed to destroy the Serb nation's will, has not damaged our determination to protect our homes."

"The destruction of telecommunication equipment and systems, as well as some elements of the air defense systems in the Serb Republic, was on a massive scale.

"However, the combat capability of the FRY's defense system has not been jeopardized since these systems in our country and the army are organized as autonomous and independent from each other. Those responsible for protecting our skies, our radar and missile operators and other specialists, continue to carry out their responsible tasks in a reliable way," Bulatovic said.

SRS Forwards No-Confidence Motion in Government

LD2509192795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1814 GMT 25 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 25 Sep (SRNA)—The Serbian Radical Party [SRS] today forwarded a motion of no confidence in the federal government to deputies of the Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly.

An explanation of the motion signed by 21 SRS deputies says that the "federal government has not been fulfilling its constitutional obligations in the domain of foreign policy, as foreign policy affairs have been surrendered to the president of one of its federal units."

According to BETA news agency, the Radicals also believe that the government prevented the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from fulfilling its obligations from the Vance plan with regard to "Croatia's aggression on western parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina."

According to SRS, the federal government has persisted in "the criminal blockade of the Serb Republic and has not done anything to help it in the course of NATO aggression," says the SRS explanation of the no confidence motion in the federal government.

SPS Spokesman Condemns Serbian Radical Party

AU2209194795 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 22 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Following yesterday's rally by Seselj's Radicals, Ivica Dacic, spokesman of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], stated:

At the time when the peace process is in the final stage, thanks primarily to the consistent and prudent policy of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and when a just and lasting peace on the territory of the previous Yugoslavia is expected to happen soon, Seselj's Radicals, with their well-known, destructive, aggressive, and primitive behavior, are continuing the policy that is in direct opposition to the interests of the Serbian people and all citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Seselj's Radicals appear not to understand that neither the nationalist pandemonium nor excelling in lies, vulgarity, and insults can hide the enormous responsibility of that party to its own people as an accomplice in the incomprehensive policy of the leaderships of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Serb Republic that led to catastrophic consequences. Those who have been constantly advocating the continuation of the unnecessary war are today mourning the fate of the people to whom they brought only further unnecessary victims and suffering instead of a just peace.

The debacle of yesterday's rally, which was announced a long time ago, is the best indicator of the political fiasco and the end of Seselj's Radicals and all other political forces of war personified in the tripartite pact of Seselj, Djindjic, and Kostunica, who have been playing heroes throughout the crisis in the previous Yugoslavia out of the range of the war operations.

On the other hand, this is a clear indication that the peace policy of Serbia and Yugoslavia enjoys enormous support among the citizens of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and the Serb people as a whole, as it is completely clear today that only the policy of peace can achieve the just goals of the Serb people's struggle for their freedom and equality.

Conflicts in SPS Seen Easing; Changes Noted

AU2209160595 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 95 p 4

[Article by Vladan Dinic: "Conflict Among Socialists Calming Down"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the wake of the tempest, there is calm in the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]. At least for the time being, the file has been closed on the disagreements between Academician Mihajlo Markovic and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic concerning the national cause, the Radio and Television of Serbia (the one that resulted in the replacement of Milorad Vucelic and appointment of Dragoljub Milanovic as acting director). At the latest Executive Committee session held last week in a rather calm atmosphere, it was decided that disputes within the party should be stopped and thereby the intensifying rumors on the impending and quick stepping down of Milomir Minic, Borisav Jovic, Mihajlo Markovic, and other prominent SPS members from their present posts be stopped as well, TELEGRAF's reliable sources claim.

At the same time, it was concluded at the Executive Committee session that there have been no convincing reasons for a heated debate on double membership—in the SPS and the Yugoslav United Left [JUL]—because, as our sources claim, the very announcement that the matter will be discussed has had a result. As we were told in the top SPS leadership, many double players, most of them directors of big firms and public enterprises—primarily those belonging to the Serbian Oil Processing Industry—have quickly regretted their conduct and at least temporarily "frozen" their JUL affiliation thus coming back to the bosom of the SPS.

Our source from the top SPS leadership points out that a much more tolerant atmosphere has been created in the Executive Committee. Discussions are led in a calm manner and without much noise. It has also been agreed that there will be no new and spectacular replacements that the excited city rumors are all about, at least not in the coming few weeks.

However, some, albeit not overly spectacular shifts will nevertheless take place: Slobodan Unkovic, deputy prime minister and minister of science and technology, should replace his current post with the one of the ambassador in Beijing and the further survival of Danilo Z. Markovic as ambassador in Moscow is still uncertain. People in the know regarding cadre reshuffles have revealed to TELEGRAF that Prof. Markovic violated protocol when he failed to welcome a delegation including Dr. Mirjana Markovic [Slobodan Milosevic's wife]. The same source, however, claims that Danilo Markovic is completely innocent in that case because the Braca Karic Company who had organized the travel of the delegation had not informed him of its arrival at all. There are some indications that Danilo Z. Markovic got even with the Karics by using diplomatic channels in Russia to make it impossible for the Braca Karic Company people to use diplomatic passports and drive cars with diplomatic license plates.

While this Markovic-Karic conflict is still on, a new story has been made public about Mihalj Braca Kertes, who is soon to step down from the post of head of the Federal Customs. According to what we could learn, a position at the Yugoslav Airlines is being reserved for Kertes. As regards his replacement, there are two versions. The first one is that this should be a person from the Montenegrin cadre list (Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic recently repeatedly expressed discontent with the work of the Federal Customs Office and blamed Mihalj Kertes for that). The second one is that Kertes will be replaced by Borislav Mikelic, the dismissed prime minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

Markovic Addresses Yugoslav Left in Novi Sad

AU2009194895 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a report from the promotion rally of the Yugoslav Left in Novi Sad. Dr. Mira Markovic, president of the directorate, has also spoken at the promotion, which is still in progress.

The Yugoslav Left held its promotion in Novi Sad in the Serbian National Theater, which was full to the last place. The Hey Slavs national anthem was played at the beginning. This was followed by Yugoslav Left representatives talking about their program and the ideas that they promote.

Vojvodina and Novi Sad have been bringing up their citizens in the spirit of freedom and equality for centuries. The patchwork of nationalities and religions in this region has always been considered to be an advantage. All differences have always been explained as an immeasurable wealth of choice.

Vojvodina has accepted 110,000 refugees and has taken upon itself a disproportionate burden of the civil war that is being fought on the territory of the previous Yugoslavia, Zivko Soklovacki said. Until the conditions are created for the return of these people to their regions and homes, the refugees should be housed throughout Yugoslavia and Serbia. There is no future without peace and security, Soklovacki said. The Yugoslav Left also favors economic equality. All forms of ownership should prove themselves in the market-defined economy, but not to the detriment of the existing social wealth.

I am personally convinced that the moral crisis in our society is greater than the crisis of theory and the crisis of organization. As soon as they encountered the first hurdle, some people left the left; they condemned it and went over to the right, Dr. Mira Markovic said, and continued:

[Begin Markovic recording] Because of the allegedly great disappointment, others have decided to stay at home. In fact, they waited to see how events would develop. [applause] Those who have stayed on the left, often conduct the policy of the right. Answering criticisms that this is immoral, they say that they have to make compromises with the right in order to remain in power. This is understandably correct. However, this does not justify them in the moral sense. And indeed, what do they need power for if they hold it for the interests of someone else's policy? Unless they care only about sheer power. And it appears that they do. [applause]

In the view of the Yugoslav Left, the prime interest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia today is not to enter the war, to enable the refugees to return from where they came as soon as possible [applause], to use all the political means to have the sanctions lifted as soon as possible, to distance itself from the extreme, nationalist, and militarist policy conducted in Knin and the policy that is today being conducted in Pale [applause], the consequences of which are an enormous number of displaced people and refugees, many dead, wounded, and desperate people, and to mobilize all the material and spiritual forces of society to develop itself economically and culturally rapidly, freely, and in a modern way after the sanctions are lifted.

This is why I, on behalf of all people in the Yugoslav Left, can say that the Yugoslav Left is not interested in creating authorities, it is interested in creating progress. [applause] [end recording]

SPO Accuses JUL of Fomenting New War

LD2209191695 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1642 GMT 22 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 22 Sep (BETA)—The Serbian Renewal Movement [Srpski pokret obnove, SPO] today accused "the Serbian communists, united under the umbrella of the Yugoslav United Left" [JUL; Milosevic's wife's party] that they are trying to "tear apart" the present-day Yugoslavia too, by attacking Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic.

A statement issued by the SPO says that the campaign against the Montenegrin prime minister "is a dangerous and clear sign that the same ideology and stupidity which destroyed Yugoslavia is continuing in the same direction, aiming at destroying even these remnants of the former Yugoslavia."

"If the Montenegrin prime minister is a smuggler and everything else the local communists accused him of today, then he was also all that several days ago when he fiercely attacked the JUL for its advocacy of social ownership and outmoded social system," the statement says.

It adds that "while talking about peace as its greatest goal, the JUL stirs up the possibility of a new tragic war, which would in fact be much more tragic than the one which has not yet ended."

Military Service Extended for 1994 Recruits

LD2109130495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1235 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 21 Sep (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Army General Staff decided today, because of the need for recruits, to extend by an additional 30 days the military service of all those in the Yugoslav Army who began their military service last September.

The information service of the Yugoslav Army General Staff stated that this additional time will be calculated as time spent on military exercise. [passage omitted]

Munitions Workers To Resume General Strike

AU2009135695 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16-17 Sep 95 p 8

[Report by "Z.R.": "'The Weapons Manufacturers' Are Going on General Strike on 27 September"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac—Owing to irregular paychecks and unfulfilled promises of the company's management and state, several thousand workers of the Special Purposes Production plant will again go on general strike on 27 September.

The decision was made at yesterday's session of the plant's trade union; a strike committee was also appointed which will "manage" the announced strike.

A decision to end the strike of Special Purposes Production workers—which lasted from 2 June to 11 July—was made at an earlier union meeting; the strike was suspended because the company's management and the relevant state authorities had solemnly promised that the problems and hardships of the Kragujevac "weapons manufacturers" would be solved.

Kosovo

Serbs To Build Houses, Offer Land to Refugees

AU2109190195 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Adaptations have started in a building situated in the Ura e Terzive location of Gjakova [Dakovica]. The aim is to construct 32 flats for Serb settlers from Croatia. The housing is reportedly dedicated to Serb households wishing to commit themselves to agriculture, in properties which have earlier been usurped by the state. The Serbian press says the Serb settlers will be granted arable land in an area which is covered by the irrigation system "Radonjiqi." October has been determined as a target for the realization of the Serbian scheme. So far, 450 Serb refugees have been settled in Gjakova. The Serbian regime have vowed they would bring in several hundreds more.

The Serb-installed authorities of the overwhelmingly Albanian-inhabited Gjakova municipality have started adapting the old town middle economics school for Serb settlers. Some 68 Serb settlers are to be accommodated in the town kindergarten. Serb settlers have been offered job opportunities, while a great number of Albanian workforce has been kicked out of the public sector.

Association Views Seizure of Albanian Complex

AU2209075695 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 20 Sep 95

[Article: "Violation of the League of Prizren Memorial—A 'Barbaric Move'"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Prizren-based Association for the Preservation of the Cultural-Historical Heritage (APCHH) has denounced the Serbian regime's intentions vis-a-vis the Lidhja e Prizrenit (The League of Prizren) memorial complex as "barbaric." The removal of exhibits from the exhibition area, ordered by Mrs. Natasa Sutakovic-Andric, the Serb-installed managing director, reportedly to make room for the accommodation of Serb settlers in the building, is an outrageous act against the Albanian cultural and historical heritage, the APCHH said in a statement.

The APCHH said Mrs. Sutakovic-Andric had ordered the removal of exhibits on 8 September, whereas two persons, speaking Serbian, attempted to break in the depot of the memorial center early morning the following day. They apparently were after the exhibits, the APCHH said. The memorial center cannot be used as shelter for anybody. The goal of the Serbian regime is merely to devastate the League of Prizren memorial center, not the cater for Serb refugees, the APCHH ended, calling on the Kosova and Albanian Governments to do everything to protect the Albanian heritage in Kosova.

Serb Security Officials Arrest Rugova's Driver

AU2109201395 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Kosovo Information Center reports that Qefser Baholli, driver of the president of the Republic of Kosovo, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, was arrested this morning by the Serbian state security officials. His family said that four Serbian state security officials raided the house at about 0930 and seized all personal items such as pictures, tapes, personal letters, his passport, etc. The Serbian security officials gave no information about the reason for the arrest.

Qefser Baholli was also apprehended by the Serbian security in 1992.

Adnan Morovci, technical secretary in President Rugova's office, has been in custody for two weeks.

Rugova's Technical Secretary Reportedly Released

AU2409161295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 23 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After being held in custody for 16 days, Adnan Merovci, technical secretary in Kosovar President Rugova's office, was released yesterday by a decision of the Serbian Procurator's Office. As has been reported, Mr. Merovci had been apprehended by the Serbian state security on 7 September under the pretext of weapons possession.

Council Reports on Serb Violence in Aug

AU2309180595 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In a monthly (August 1995) report on human rights abuses in Kosova, the Prishtina-based Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) says the Serbian regime/police repression against the people of Kosova has further stepped up throughout Kosova embracing all strata and ages of the population. Under the arms searches excuse and other Serbian regime contrived pretexts, as many as 147 Albanians had their homes raided on by the Serbian police expeditions over August alone. One ethnic Albanian from Kosova was shot dead by Serb soldier (26 August), while 318 persons were subjected to diverse forms of ill-treatment, 138 were beaten up, out of them 27 having sought medical treatment afterwards, says the report.

Albanian political, educational, and human rights activists were particularly persecuted by the Serbian police over the past month. Eighty-one Albanians were held to the so-called Serbian police "informative conversations," 152 Albanians were summoned to report to the police while Serb policemen have inquired about 42 other Albanians at their homes. The report says that children, women and old people were likewise subjected to Serbian police ill-treatment and harassment, illustrating it with the cases of 14 children, 17 old people, and four old persons having been subjected to brutal practice of the Serbian police.

Over the past month the Serbian police has been also hunting down draft-age Albanian males so they would either be forcibly drafted into Serbian Army or persecuted for having deserted it earlier. Five Albanian youths were arrested by the Serbian police and tried before Serbian military courts in Serbia while seven others were wanted by the police. During August, two Albanian families were forcefully evicted from their apartments and Serb families were settled in them later, the report says. The CDHRF report makes mention of other practices of the Serbian regime in Kosova, such as raids on Albanian-language schools, intimidation of schoolchildren, raids on marketplaces and Albanian-owned shops, the plundering of personal belongings from citizens, etc.

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